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ABSTRACT 
Globalization and the liberal international marketplace have provided fertile ground for 
the rise of transnational and non-state actors. Unfortunately, while states and businesses 
have profited from the increased fluidity of borders and the rise of global commerce, so 
have the criminal organizations that threaten national and international security. These 
illicit networks are stateless; they conduct their business in failed or failing states, under 
the guise of legitimate commerce, and without regard to sovereign borders or even human 
life. They are the main facilitators of proliferation, terrorism, and narcotics around the 
world—undeterred and, perhaps, undeterrable. This thesis offers a comparative analysis 
of three main types of illicit networks: terrorist, proliferation and narcotics networks. 
Using Jemaah Islamiyah, the A.Q. Khan proliferation network, and the Medellín drug 
‘cartel’ as case studies, it examines their typologies, motivations, structures, 
characteristics, and sources and patterns of funding. It examines if and how illicit 
networks overlap, with special attention to intra-network (e.g., terrorist networks with 
other terrorist networks) and inter-network (e.g., terrorist networks with narcotics 
networks) overlap. It then explores how this information can inform U.S. counter-
network activity.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Globalization and the liberal international marketplace have provided fertile 
ground for the rise of transnational and non-state actors. Unfortunately, while states and 
businesses have profited from the increased fluidity of borders and the rise of global 
commerce, so have the criminal organizations that threaten national and international 
security. These illicit networks exist within the shadows of legitimate trade and 
governance. They exploit an abundant supply of small arms and natural resources that 
fuel violent conflict, and plot acts of terrorism from the refuge of ungoverned spaces. 
They are stateless; they conduct their business in failed or failing states, under the guise 
of legitimate commerce, and without regard to sovereign borders or even human life. 
They are the main facilitators of proliferation, terrorism, and narcotics around the 
world—undeterred and, perhaps, undeterrable. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, brought to the forefront of 
policymakers’ minds the imminent need to adapt U.S. foreign policy objectives to 
address this new strategic landscape. It became abundantly clear that U.S. foreign policy 
could no longer afford to focus exclusively on coherent nation states as the primary 
adversary. In the wake of 9/11, there was a push among policymakers, military officials 
and academics alike to understand the nature of the terrorist threat to the United States. 
This resulted in an emergence of extensive literature on terrorism and terrorist networks, 
particularly those that target the “far enemy” (i.e., the United States). Shortly after 9/11, 
another series of events illustrated the threat posed by illicit networks. When U.S. and 
British agents finally brought down A. Q. Khan’s notorious proliferation network, Khan 
and his gang had already spread nuclear weapons technology to Iran, North Korea, Libya, 
and perhaps others. Khan’s elaborate global network—established to procure sensitive  
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technology for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program—had gone into business for itself, 
providing information, technology, materials, and expertise to countries that wanted them 
for a large profit. 
Today, just south of the U.S. border, Mexican drug trafficking networks—
sometimes referred to as ‘cartels’—terrorize the local population. They function more 
like gangs, using kidnapping, extortion, and murder to achieve their objectives. Their 
bloody tactics continue to make regular headlines. In May 2010, 55 bodies were 
discovered in an abandoned mine just south of Mexico City. In July, 51 corpses were 
found near a trash dump outside of Monterrey. In August, Mexican marines discovered 
an unprecedented 72 bodies in San Fernando, Mexico—just 100 miles south of Texas.1 
Over 30,000 people have been killed in drug-gang violence in Mexico alone since the turf 
battle began between the Mexican Zetas and Gulf “cartels” in 2006.2 Narcotics and 
narcotics-related corruption continue to be endemic problems worldwide, and pose 
significant barriers to progress in their respective regions.  
The literature on networks is largely “stovepiped,” meaning it is focused on one 
issue or threat at the expense of the broader picture. The terrorism literature, for instance, 
focuses on terrorist networks at the expense of other illicit networks that pose potentially 
equal, albeit less visible, threats to the United States. Columbian drug networks are alive 
and well, and Mexican drug gangs are increasingly prominent just south of the U.S. 
border. Procurement networks make use of front companies and the liberal import/export 
laws that facilitate international commerce to transport and transship dual-use materials 
that could be used for the production of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). To 
complicate matters, networks can engage in multiple illicit activities, making it difficult 
to draw clear lines between them. For example, there is speculation that terror, 
proliferation, and drug networks may overlap to provide global jihadists, such as Al 
Qaeda, with weapons of mass destruction. 
                                                 
1 Associated Press, “72 Bodies Found in Northern Mexico,” New York Times, August 25, 
2010,http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2010/08/25/world/AP-LT-Drug-War-Mexico.html?_r=1 (accessed 
August 25, 2010). 
2 Ibid.  
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Current U.S. government efforts to counter these activities are similarly 
“stovepiped,” The term “cylinders of excellence” has been used to describe organizations 
such as the National Counterterrorism Center and the National Counterproliferation 
Center, which focus on their individual specialty, but pay insufficient attention to the 
overlap between hostile entities to the United States. Additionally, bureaucratic rivalries 
have prevented different organizations from sharing information that would be helpful to 
combat these illicit networks. There is a need, therefore, in the U.S. government to both 
examine more closely the structures and motivations of these networks and to use that 
information to tailor its counter-network activity.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis offers a comparative analysis of three main types of illicit networks: 
terrorist, proliferation and narcotics networks. Using social and criminal network analysis 
as a framework, it examines their typologies, motivations, structures, characteristics and 
financing. For each type of network, I examine one particular case study and ask the 
following questions: What is its motivation? How is it structured? What are its sources 
and patterns of funding? Does it overlap with similar types of networks (e.g., terrorist 
groups with other terrorist groups)? Does it overlap with dissimilar networks (e.g., 
narcotics networks with terrorist networks)? Where there is overlap, what is the nature of 
this collaboration? Finally, how can this information be used to tailor U.S. counter-
network activity?  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a lack of consensus in the literature about what exactly constitutes a 
network, especially in international relations. The term “network” is often used 
ubiquitously to describe any organization that does not fit into the typical hierarchy or 
market configuration. It can describe anything from one’s business associates or 
Facebook friends to Al Qaeda and the global Salafi jihad. So far, there has been very little 
recognition in the literature about the degree of variation among network structures, 
which this thesis seeks to remedy.  
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Network analysis looks for patterns in the relationships between nodes, which can 
be hubs, cliques, or brokers. This science assumes network relations are inherently 
dynamic. Social network analysis (SNA) emerged out of sociology in an effort to explain 
the behavioral elements of network actors. A “social network” is comprised of a finite set 
or sets of actors with relations among them.3 This method attempts to identify patterns of 
interactions, which can then be used to predict behavior. It uses the language of network 
analysis to explain relations between individuals, groups, and organizations, and can help 
prescribe courses of action that will potentially influence behavior. 
While there has been research dedicated to understanding the nature of illicit 
networks, network analysis is not yet adequate to explain them. Network analysis tools 
were first employed in international relations in the late 1960s and early 1970s by 
academics like Savage and Deutsch, Brams, Sjelsbaek and Christopherson, who sought to 
examine the emergent structures in an increasingly globalized world.4 Their research 
focused on licit enterprises, like intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and even the 
states themselves. As Hafner-Burton et al. point out in “Network Analysis for 
International Relations,” networks are typically viewed in international relations as “a 
mode of organization that facilitates collective action and cooperation, exercises 
influence, or serves as a means of international governance.” Until recently, this 
discipline has not treated networks as structures that can enable or constrain individual 
agents and influence international outcomes.5  
It was not until the 1990s that researchers began to apply network analysis tools to 
the “core problems of international relations,” which included terrorist and other “dark” 
organizations.6 In 1991, Malcolm Sparrow attempted to identify opportunities for the 
application of SNA to the problems of criminal intelligence analysis. In particular, he 
focused on the identification of key vulnerabilities in different types of criminal 
                                                 
3 Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications In 
Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 20. 
4 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Miles Kahler, and Alexander H. Montgomery, “Network Analysis for 
International Relations,” International Organizations 63, no. 3 (Summer 2009). 
5 Ibid., 4. 
6 Ibid., 7. 
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organizations, from terrorist groups to narcotics supply networks.7 Researchers applied 
SNA techniques to the analysis of criminal networks with the hope that the emerging 
information could be used to tailor law enforcement efforts. Valdis Krebs describes this 
as the third generation of criminal network analysis and visualizations, following manual 
link charts and graphic-based computer net charts.8 Ideally, this tool set would enhance 
an analyst’s predictive capability and improve counter-network efforts.9  
While there have been significant improvements in network mapping technology, 
much still remains to be explored about the applicability of these tools to covert or 
clandestine networks. The study of organizations that thrive on secrecy invites 
incomplete or unreliable information, which make them very difficult to map and 
interpret. Jennifer Xu and Hsinchun Chen identify potential challenges in their article in 
“Criminal Network Analysis and Visualization,” in which they argue that SNA routinely 
fails to address the problems of incomplete, incorrect and inconsistent data. Also, it often 
fails to take into account data transformation, ambiguous boundaries, and changing 
network dynamics.10 SNA, therefore, is insufficient to explain “dark” networks as a tool 
in and of itself. This is where an analyst’s experience and intuition could help pull 
together the pieces of the puzzle where other types of modeling are lacking. 
Confusion in the literature over convergent views on networks in general is 
compounded by the confusion over divergent views on the nature of individual networks. 
While some researchers treat the network model as ubiquitous, others argue over the 
structures of specific networks. Marc Sageman is both famous and infamous for his 
analysis of the global Salafi jihad, which he argues has moved away from its pre-9/11 
                                                 
7 Malcolm K. Sparrow, “The Application of Network Analysis to Criminal Intelligence: An 
Assessment of the Prospects,” Social Networks 13, no. 3 (1991): 251–274. 
8 Valdis E. Krebs, “Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells,” Connections 24, no. 3 (2001): 43–52. 
9 Steven Aftergood, “Secrecy News: Social Network Analysis and Intelligence,” Federation of 
American Scientists Project on Government Secrecy no. 15 (2004), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2004/02/020904.html (accessed October 12, 2010). 
10 Jennifer Xu and Hsinchun Chen, “Criminal Network Analysis and Visualization,” Communications 
of the ACM 48 no. 5 (June 2005): 101. 
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hierarchical structure in favor of a more dispersed “network” structure.11 Sageman has 
been widely criticized by Bruce Hoffman and other like-minded terrorism experts who 
argue that Al Qaeda is not as dispersed as Sageman thinks. They contend that, despite the 
increase in fledgling “grass roots” Islamist movements that associate themselves with Al 
Qaeda, the organization still operates with a core leadership and top-down instruction.12 
As such, it is a “hybrid” organization, with both top-down and bottom-up information 
flows.  
Narcotics networks have been of concern since long before the declared “war on 
drugs,” but are especially important to examine today. Increasing violence in Mexico has 
resulted in nearly 30,000 drug-related deaths—over 7,200 of which occurred in just one 
year as law enforcement authorities battle territorial cartels.13 The war in Mexico alone 
has resulted in more casualties than have occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan combined; 
furthermore, violence has begun to spill across the border into the United States. With the 
increase in U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan, it is critical to scrutinize the strong link 
between insurgency, corruption and opium that continues to plague progress in the 
region. With the Taliban and high-level Afghan leaders, alike, benefitting from the drug 
trade, it is difficult to imagine a U.S.-Afghan policy that does not take this nexus into 
consideration. Like terrorist networks, drug networks engage in violent behavior, often 
employing gruesome techniques that instill terror in the local population as they battle 
their turf wars.  
Perhaps the best example of the danger of nuclear proliferation networks is that of 
Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. Gordon Corera, whose book Shopping for Bombs provides a 
comprehensive overview of Khan’s network and its implications, contends, “A. Q. Khan 
has had a greater impact on nuclear proliferation than any other individual in the last 
                                                 
11 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia, PA: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 
12 Bruce Hoffman, “The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama bin Laden Still Matters,” 
Foreign Affairs (May/June 2008). 
13 Mark Landler, “Clinton Says U.S. Feeds Mexico Drug Trade,” New York Times,  March 26, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/26/world/americas/26mexico.html 
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three decades.”14 Tasked by the Pakistan government to procure materials for its state 
nuclear weapons program, Khan had access to nuclear suppliers and supplies of dual-use 
materials around the globe. An opportunistic businessman with unprecedented access and 
contacts, he took advantage of his position and exported centrifuge technology (and 
possibly bomb designs), to North Korea, Iran, and Libya. David Albright explains in 
detail in his recent book Peddling Peril how Dr. Khan acquired his nuclear expertise as a 
metallurgist working in the Netherlands, how he rose to prominence when President 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto pushed to develop a clandestine nuclear weapons program for 
Pakistan, and then used his contacts and expertise to go into business for himself with 
relative ease.  
Jonathan Tucker examines the illicit procurement networks behind Iraq and Iran’s 
chemical weapons programs in his article Trafficking Networks for Chemical Weapons 
Precursors: Lessons from the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. Though these cases are 
decades old, Tucker rightly emphasizes that their insights are still very relevant because 
the methods of illicit trafficking have not fundamentally changed.15 Though they were 
after different materials, the nature of Frans van Anraat and Peter Walaschek’s networks 
and operations bear distinct similarities to those of A.Q. Khan as well as Viktor Bout—
one of the largest international arms traffickers in history, who was recently extradited to 
the United States. Albright’s Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) has 
published a wealth of literature on unclassified case studies on procurement networks that 
have facilitated the transfer of illicit materials worldwide. With its access to satellite 
imagery, ISIS reports regularly on today’s procurement networks facilitating the nuclear 
programs in Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan, among others.  
Both narcotics networks and procurement networks differ from terrorist networks 
in that they are motivated by profit—not ideology or religion. Given their market 
structure, they flow easily under the radar, navigating seamlessly between licit and illicit 
activities. They also involve a whole range of people, from outright criminals to greedy 
                                                 
14 Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 5. 
15 Jonathan B. Tucker, “Trafficking Networks for Chemical Weapons Precursors: Lessons from the 
Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s,” Occasional Paper no. 13 (Monterey, CA: James Martin Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, 2008). 
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businessmen who are willing to turn a blind eye for a profit. Transnational crime expert 
Phil Williams writes that “arms smuggling often involves institutions and individuals 
who are not parts of criminal organizations: national defense ministries, national security 
agencies, banks, legitimate arms dealers, and a wide variety of groups involved in the 
internal power struggles within nations.”16 Moisés Naím reiterates this point in Illicit, 
noting that people involved in unlawful activities are often difficult to identify because 
“they hide in plain sight. They are hard to take out, because their involvement in the trade 
is just one aspect of their business, lost in the stream of legitimate commerce.”17  
Despite their differences, these networks do overlap, and their activities thrive in 
unstable political conditions. Glenn Curtis and Tara Karacan argue in their study for the 
Library of Congress that the same variety of buyers, sellers and middlemen exist among 
different kinds of smuggling operations.18 They write that “the globalization of financial, 
commercial, transportation, and communication networks has enabled buyers and sellers 
to locate each other, identify points of common interest, and establish terms of 
cooperation.”19 Curtis and Karacan identify three main types of associations between 
illicit groups: first, alliances for mutual benefit that do not cross ideological missions; 
second, the direct involvement of terrorists in organized crime; and third, the replacement 
of ideology by profit as a motivator for terrorist operations.20 Western Europe and North 
America, in particular, have major narcotics markets and wide-open commercial “nodes” 
that increasingly serve the trafficking needs of both criminal and terrorist networks. 
Likewise, Southeast Asia is an up-and-coming economic region, with many small islands 
and wide-open seas that make trafficking of any kind difficult to police. In these and 
other regions, the infrastructure and circumstance that benefit one type of illicit activity 
often benefit others. For example, Curtis and Karacan point out that: 
                                                 
16 Tucker, “Trafficking Networks,” 4. 
17 Moisés Naím, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy 
(New York: Doubleday, 2005), 65.  
18 Glenn Curtis and Tara Karacan, “The Nexus among Terrorists, Narcotics Traffickers, Weapons 
Proliferators, and Organized Crime Networks in Western Europe,” The Library of Congress (December 
2002), 2. 
19 Curtis and Karacan, “The Nexus among Terrorists,” 3. 
20 Ibid., 22. 
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The demand for illegal weapons in Western Europe has supplemented the 
demand in Africa and Asia that has supported trafficking networks that 
base their operations on stockpiles in the former Warsaw Pact nations, the 
former Yugoslavia, and the former Soviet Union. This demand, which is 
based both in terrorist groups and in organized crime networks, ultimately 
benefits both corrupt military and civilian operators in source countries 
such as Bulgaria, Ukraine, Russia, and Romania, and intermediary agents 
such as Albanian, Croatian, Romanian, and Serbian criminal groups. The 
ongoing world demand for military-type weapons has slowed efforts by 
struggling countries such as Bulgaria and Romania to dispose of their 
military surpluses in less lucrative but more socially beneficial ways.21 
There is a view in the literature that it takes a network to counter a network. This 
phrase has been cited repeatedly to describe the challenge illicit networks pose to law 
enforcement and other hierarchical, state-sponsored institutions. John Arquilla and David 
Rondfeldt address this specifically in Networks and Netwars, in which they examine how 
modern communications have shaped nontraditional warfare (e.g., the 9/11 attacks), and 
assess the suitability of government entities to address this new form of “netwar.”22 
Researchers like Phil Williams, Arquilla and Ronfeldt contend that law enforcement 
agencies and government institutions face a difficult challenge because they are 
constrained by national borders and regulations, whereas illicit networks are not.23 Other 
researchers point to the prominence of states in the international system as evidence of 
their staying power, and make the argument that hierarchies are, in fact, suited to combat 
illicit networks.  
E. HYPOTHESES AND PROBLEMS 
I hypothesize that the three main types of illicit networks are distinct. Terrorist 
networks are unique in that they are ideologically motivated. Networks like Al Qaeda that 
target the “far enemy” are therefore dangerous not only because of what they are capable 
of within their own organized structures, but because of their ability to inspire small, like-
                                                 
21 Curtis and Karacan, “The Nexus among Terrorists,” 25. 
22 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and 
Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001). 
23 Phil Williams, “The Nature of Drug-Trafficking Networks,” Current History (April 1998): 156. 
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minded groups to take action in the name of their larger movement, or jihad. Terrorist 
groups, and especially smaller “grass roots” cells, are likely to have strong ties of kinship 
and trust, which both bind them together and isolate them from the outside world.  
In contrast, both narcotics and procurement networks are profit-driven. Drugs and 
dual-use materials are hot commodities on the black market, leading to the hypothesis 
that these networks are demand-driven and follow a market structure. However, these 
networks are different in that the relationships between individuals, or “nodes,” in 
procurement networks, are purely transactional, whereas the links between nodes in 
narcotics networks are more likely to be based on ethnic or familial ties. Narcotics 
networks are constantly fighting each other in turf wars, and are willing and able to resort 
to violence. Individual members of procurement networks, on the other hand, are not 
armed and are generally unwilling to engage in violence. They are only in it to make a 
buck. 
F. METHODS AND SOURCES 
In this thesis, I begin each chapter by framing the problem of terrorism, 
proliferation and narcotics trafficking in today’s context. I then review the prevailing 
literature on terrorism, proliferation and narcotics networks to offer specific network 
typologies for each. Typology building involves the categorization of large amounts of 
information into a single set of terms to make it more manageable for analysis.24 It is 
evident from the stovepiped nature of the literature that there is an assumption that illicit 
networks operate within one main function: terrorism, proliferation, or drug trafficking. 
The organizations intended to counter them are therefore not designed to accommodate 
the possibility that there is overlap between different kinds of networks, or that they are 
multi-purposed. I examine a variety of sources, including academic journals, books and 
periodicals, to establish generalizations about the motivations, structures, funding, and 
nature of network overlap for terrorist, proliferation and narcotics networks. I attempt to  
 
                                                 
24 Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, 
Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, & Literature (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 
2005), 39. 
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determine whether groups that overlap with different types of networks do so to the 
extent that it benefits their main objective, or whether they can become multi-purposed, 
or evolve from their original motivation. 
I then test the specific typology for each type of network through the careful 
examination of a case study. I selected the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist network, A.Q. 
Khan’s nuclear proliferation enterprise, and the Medellin drug ‘cartel’ as case studies 
because they are all well studied and documented in open source literature, in spite of 
their covert nature. When studying dark networks, it is often difficult to obtain complete 
and reliable information until after the network has been exposed or disrupted, due to the 
secret nature of their operations and internal workings. By selecting well-known case 
studies, I am able to more accurately examine their motivations, structures, sources and 
patterns of funding, and overlap with other networks, from which I draw lessons to 
inform U.S. policy and counter-network activity in today’s context. Because these case 
studies vary greatly in terms of their function, location, etc., I ask the same set of 
questions for each in order to maintain consistency between chapters.  
G. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter I was an introduction to the topic and literature review of networks and 
social network analysis in general. Chapter II looks specifically at terrorist networks, 
using Jemaah Islamiyah as a case study. Chapter III examines proliferation networks, 
using the A.Q. Khan network as a case study. Chapter IV looks at narcotics networks, 
using the Medellín ‘cartel’ as a case study. In each chapter, I begin with a review of the 
literature to construct a specific typology for terrorist, proliferation and narcotics 
networks. I then focus on a particular case study, of which I ask the same set of 
questions: What is its motivation? How is it structured? What are its sources and patterns 
of funding? Does it overlap with other similar networks? Does it overlap with dissimilar 
networks? Where there is overlap, what is the nature of that relationship? Each chapter 
concludes with network-specific observations and recommendations for how this 
information can be used to tailor counter-network activity. Chapter V summarizes the 
defining characteristics of each individual network typology, noting the distinct 
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similarities and differences between them. It then makes overall suggestions for how the 
conclusions from this thesis are informative for efforts to further understand and counter 
illicit network activity.  
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II. TERRORIST NETWORKS: JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. Why Terrorist Networks Are Important 
The events of September 11, 2001, brought to the forefront of our minds the 
imminent threat that terrorism and terrorists pose to U.S. and international security 
interests. The successful attacks against the World Trade Towers and Pentagon 
highlighted the extent to which non-state actors in particular could inflict damage, and 
indeed terror, on our way of life. In spite of all the economic growth and progress that 
followed the end of the Cold War, 9/11 proved that even a superpower was vulnerable to 
penetration by outsiders with mal-intent. From this point forward, a preoccupation with 
terrorism reshaped the U.S. foreign policy narrative and landed Osama bin Laden the title 
of Public Enemy Number One.  
Yet the use of terrorism as a tactic is not a new phenomenon, as the post-9/11 
hype would suggest. Rather, states and non-state actors alike have has employed it to 
their advantage for centuries.25 The definition of terrorism, according to Jeffrey Bale of 
the Monterey Institute of International Studies is “the use or threat of the use of violence, 
directed against victims selected for their symbolic or representative value as a means of 
instilling anxiety in, transmitting one or more messages to, and thereby manipulating the 
perceptions and behavior of wider target audiences.”26 Accepting this definition, it is 
evident that the only thing truly new about terrorism in the post-9/11 era is the 
connotation it now engenders.  Today’s use of the term is more propagandistic than 
accurate; it is often overly broad, and focuses on specific actions rather than targeted 
messages. Furthermore, it is too narrowly associated with anti-government violence, 
                                                 
25 States have been the biggest perpetrators of terrorism—not groups. In the twentieth century alone, 
upwards of 150 million people were killed by states, which vastly exceed the number of deaths by 
insurgents and non-state actors. For specific data sets see: Schmid and Jongman, “Data and Data Bases on 
State and Non-State Terrorism,” Political Terrorism, 137–175. 
26 Jeffrey Bale, Introduction to Terrorism seminar (class notes), U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, January–March, 2009.  
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which means that it is frequently—and inaccurately—used interchangeably with words 
like insurgent, Taliban or guerilla. While this propagandistic use of “terrorism” serves to 
delegitimize the enemy in a moral way, it also contributes to general confusion over what 
exactly constitutes a “terrorist” or a “terrorist network,” which this thesis attempts to 
remedy. 
While terrorism is not a new phenomenon, 9/11 did make clear that it was not just 
a problem “over there,” as had once been assumed, but rather a transnational problem that 
spans borders and oceans and requires a multi-national response. The liberal economic 
policies that followed the end of the Cold War prompted increased movement across 
previously stringent borders and promoted the expansion of transnational corporations 
and free trade agreements. Simultaneously, technological advances like the Internet made 
trade, travel and communication easier, and national borders more porous than ever 
before. Unfortunately, globalization came with a cost: terrorists and other types of illicit 
networks exploited the same advantages that states and businesses enjoyed. In essence, 
globalization empowered the rise of the non-state actor.  
Another major unintended consequence of the end of the Cold War was the rise of 
violent Islamist extremism. While the United States utilized the Afghan mujahedin to 
push out the Soviets after their invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, they inadvertently 
created a well-trained cadre of now radicalized jihadists such as Osama bin Laden, who 
use small arms from the Soviet era, exploit the Internet and other news media, and take 
advantage of porous state borders and failed or failing states to plan and execute terrorist 
activity. This is such an important problem that combating violent extremism is the first 
mission objective in the most recent National Intelligence Strategy, produced by the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence in August 2009.27 This document states 
clearly that “Violent extremist groups—primarily al-Qa’ida [sic] and its regional 
affiliates, supporters, and the local terrorist cells it inspires—will continue to pose a grave 
threat to U.S. persons and interests at home and abroad.”28 As such, the first U.S. mission 
                                                 
27 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “The National Intelligence Strategy” (Washington, 
DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2009), 6. 
28 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Strategy, 6. 
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objective is to “understand, monitor, and disrupt violent extremist groups that actively 
plot to inflict grave damage or harm to the United States, its people, interests, and 
allies.”29 In order to effectively warn against impending terrorist attacks, disrupt plans 
already underway, prevent catastrophic WMD terrorism, and counter the proliferation of 
violent extremism, U.S. civilian and military forces must first understand the nature of 
the threat, the motivations of those that threaten them, and the structure and tactics they 
employ to achieve their objectives. This understanding is the foundation for a successful 
counterterrorism strategy.  
2. Why Jemaah Islamiyah Was Chosen as a Case Study 
I chose Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) as a case study because it is a well-studied terrorist 
network with available open source material on its motivations, structure, funding and 
affiliations. As the very nature of terrorist or shadowy networks makes them difficult to 
study, it is important to select a case study from which there is accurate information to 
draw analysis and conclusions. Al Qaeda is perhaps the most well known terrorist 
network—particularly since 9/11—but Al Qaeda has been studied throughout the last 
decade at the expense of other dangerous organizations. JI has known affiliations with Al 
Qaeda and other regional terrorist networks, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) and the Abu Sayyef Group (ASG). It has been responsible for the most deadly 
terrorist attack since 9/11—the 2002 Bali bombings—and is believed to have been behind 
the simultaneous bombings in Jakarta on the Ritz Carlton and Marriott hotels in July 
2009. JI has engaged in a wide spectrum of criminal activity across Southeast Asia, and is 
responsible for producing the region’s most wanted terrorist: Noordin Mohammed Top.  
3. Roadmap 
In this chapter, I examine the prevailing literature on terrorism to offer a brief 
explanation of the terrorist network typology and to draw conclusions about terrorist 
networks in general. By focusing on Jemaah Islamiyah as a case study, I will seek to 
answer the following questions: What is its motivation? How is it structured? What are its 
                                                 
29 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Strategy, 6.  
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sources and patterns of funding? Does it overlap with other similar networks (i.e., with 
other terrorist networks)? Does it overlap with dissimilar networks (e.g., with narcotics 
networks or other criminal activity)? Where there is network overlap, does that 
connection influence JI’s ideological objective? Finally, I examine the implications of 
these findings on counterterrorism strategy and activity.  
B. TERRORIST NETWORK TYPOLOGY 
A terrorist network is a network of actors that relies primarily on terrorism as a 
tactic to achieve its objectives. As Chalmers Johnson noted in 1978, there are “almost as 
many typologies of terrorism as there are analysts.” While there is no single way classify 
this type of network, which can vary in size, ideology, structure, etc., there are certain 
similarities across the board that are useful in building a network typology. Most often, 
terrorist networks are ideologically driven. They are frequently based on close trust ties—
linked by family, marriage, shared principles, training and combat experience—and 
generally only overlap with other terrorist or criminal networks if it serves their 
ideological objective. 
Ideology can be defined as “the beliefs, values, principles, and objectives – 
however ill-defined or tenuous – by which a group defines its instinctive political identity 
and aims, and justifies its actions.”30 Ideologies are structured, relatively coherent, and 
often all-encompassing worldviews that provide a new vision of a better world, and a 
guide for action.31 Terrorism today is often associated with extremist ideology. Like 
“terrorism,” the word “extremism” often carries a negative connotation, which 
inaccurately gives the impression that it is a qualitative assessment rather than a defining 
term for analysis. The characteristics of extremism, and of extremist ideology, are: 
Manichaeism, which delineates good vs. evil; monism, meaning anyone who disagrees is 
evil; authoritarianism/totalitarianism; collectivism, in which the rights of the individual 
are subordinate to the interests of the group; utopianism, or striving for perfection; and 
                                                 
30 C.J.M. Drake, Terrorists’ Target Selection (London: MacMillan Press LTD, 1998), 16. 
31 Bale, Introduction to Terrorism seminar. 
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the demonization/dehumanization of opponents and enemies.32 There are five main 
categories of extremist ideologies that insurgent groups embrace: (1) ethno-nationalist 
(e.g., the Irish Republican Army, Palestinian Liberation Organization); (2) secular left-
wing (e.g., the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Shining Path); (3) 
secular right-wing (e.g., Secret Army Organization in French Algeria); (4) religious (e.g., 
Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah); and (5) single-issue (e.g., animal rights or anti-abortion 
groups).33 These major categories are not exclusive: primarily religious groups, like 
Hamas or Hezbollah, have assumed an ethno-nationalist identity; similarly, primarily 
ethno-nationalist groups, like the ETA, have adopted religious underpinnings. Because JI 
is primarily motivated by a religious extremist ideology, that will be the focus of this 
chapter.  
Religions of all kinds are founded on a core belief in the existence of supernatural 
or spiritual beings. Of the three main categories of religion—pantheistic, polytheistic and 
monotheistic—monotheistic religions are the most prone to extremism. Pantheistic 
religions, like Daoism, ascribe supernatural agency to natural phenomena; they do not 
tend to manifest extremism. Polytheistic religions, like Hinduism or ancient Greek and 
Roman, believe in multiple gods, but are typically inclusive of different cultures and 
deities. This creates less room for conflict with other belief systems and makes them less 
prone to extremism.34 Monotheistic religions, like Judaism, Christianity and Islam, 
believe in one transcendent god. These are the most prone to extremism because they 
tend to be exclusionary; by definition, they are more likely to create conflict with other 
belief systems. Terrorist networks that are founded on religion typically seek to smite 
evildoers and purported enemies of god. They often want to impose strict religious tenets 
on society, forcibly insert religion into the political sphere, and bring about an 
Armageddon, or other apocalyptic scenario.35  
                                                 
32 Bale, Introduction to Terrorism seminar. 
33 Ibid. 
34 There are many examples of Hindu terrorism, for example, although this thesis contends that 
terrorism based on polytheistic religious extremism is not generally the norm.  
35 Bale, Introduction to Terrorism seminar. 
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The proportion of groups that rely on religious terrorism is growing—now nearly 
70 percent of all terrorist networks.36 David Rapoport calls this the “most arresting and 
unexpected development” in recent years.37 There are important qualitative differences 
between religious and secular violence. As Charles Selengut argues in Sacred Fury, 
religious faith is different from other forms of leadership because it is entirely outside of 
the normal rules and interactions.38 The faithful are required to conform to religious law, 
which can trump manmade law.39 Most importantly, religion enables those who follow it 
to invoke “holy terrorism.” In a cosmic war, the belief in one’s divine duty can legitimize 
indiscriminate violence.40 This invites martyrdom—the acceptance of death for a cause—
because the promise of eternal life motivates warriors and breaks what would otherwise 
be constraints on self-destructive behavior.41 While terrorist targets can be selected for 
their symbolic, functional, logistical or expressive value, religious terrorism is most often 
exclusively symbolic.42 
Islamism is a political ideology—not a religion. It is a radical anti-secular, anti-
Western political ideology with both revolutionary and revivalist elements based on a 
strict, puritanical interpretation of Islam.43 It is a type of activist fundamentalist 
movement in which participants take action to reverse the corruption of the external 
world. All Islamists are fundamentalists, but not all fundamentalists are Islamists. 
Fundamentalism is a reaction against what is perceived as the corruption of religious 
interpretation. It is an attempt by religious movements to return to what they regard as the 
                                                 
36 Bruce Hoffman, “Old Madness, New Methods: Revival of Religious Terrorism Begs for Broader 
U.S. Policy,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publications, 1998), 
http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/rr.winter98.9/methods. 
37 David C. Rapoport, “Sacred Terror: A Contemporary Example from Islam,” in Origins of 
Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, ed. Walter Reich (Washington, DC: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), 103. 
38 Charles Selengut, Sacred Fury: Understanding Religious Violence (Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press, 
2004).  
39 Ibid.  
40 Mark Jurgensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 2001). 
41 Jurgensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God.  
42 Drake, Terrorists’ Target Selection, 9; Jurgensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, 220.  
43 Bale, Introduction to Terrorism seminar. 
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pure, uncorrupted foundations of their religion. In practice, this also generally involves a 
strict, puritanical interpretation of sacred religious texts, and a meticulous adherence to 
behavioral norms derived from that interpretation. Islamism is a reaction to growing 
Western dominance in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that is based on a radical 
rejection of Western secular values; resistance to infidel political, social, economic and 
cultural influences over the Muslim world; extreme hostility toward less committed and 
militant Muslims (often labeled takfirs, or non-Muslims); and the demand for the creation 
of an Islamic state governed by a strict puritanical interpretation of sharia law.44 
Islamists can be gradualists, which seek to transform the consciousness of Muslims over 
time (e.g., Muslim Brotherhood), or violent jihadist groups, which used armed struggle to 
achieve their objectives (e.g., Al Qaeda). Violent Islamist groups can be focused on the 
“near enemy,” which are local/national non-Muslim or apostate regimes, or the “far 
enemy,” which are global enemies. Groups like Al Qaeda that are focused on the “far 
enemy” tend to have a world-transformative agenda.  
C. J. M. Drake argues in Terrorists’ Target Selection that all terrorists typically go 
through the same set of stages, whether they are conscious of them or not: they set up a 
logistical support network; select potential targets; conduct reconnaissance and gather 
information on those targets; plan the operation; insert weapons and operators into the 
area of operations; execute the operation; extract the operational team; and finally issue 
communiqués explaining their objectives.45 Terrorist networks employ a number of 
organizational structures that can be adapted based on circumstance. The structure of a 
terrorist network must always strike a delicate balance between command and control 
(C2) and operational security (OPSEC). Three basic structures strike this balance in 
different ways. The first type includes a leadership directorate that gives instructions and 
orders to various cells. This type has the highest level of C2 but the lowest level of 
OPSEC. The second type is more of a clique, with no leadership but many links between 
cells. This type strikes the most even balance between C2 and OPSEC. The third type is 
                                                 
44 Sharia is Islamic law. It literally means “the way, the path.” Bale, Introduction to Terrorism 
seminar. 
45 Drake, Terrorists’ Target Selection, 54. 
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what has been referred to as “leaderless resistance” by the American right. In it, members 
of individual cells all share the same worldview and therefore operate independently 
without any coordination between them. There is no connection between cells, which 
offers the lowest amount of C2 but the highest amount of OPSEC.46  
The organizational structure, weapons and tactics of a terrorist network—what 
Rapoport refers to as the means—are constantly modified to accommodate changing 
circumstances (e.g., the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan).47 This makes terrorist networks 
flexible and adaptable in a way that government bureaucracies are often not. Marc 
Sageman addresses this topic in Leaderless Jihad, in which he argues that that the global 
Salafi jihad has moved away from its pre-9/11 hierarchical structure (like the first type) in 
favor of a more dispersed “network” structure (like the third type).48 Sageman has been 
widely criticized by Bruce Hoffman and other like-minded terrorism experts who argue 
that Al Qaeda is not as dispersed as Sageman thinks. Hoffman argues that despite the 
increase in fledgling “grass roots” Islamist movements that associate themselves with Al 
Qaeda, the organization still operates with a core leadership and top-down instruction, 
which makes it a “hybrid” organization, with both top-down and bottom-up information 
flows.49 Either way, these and other researchers agree that Al Qaeda is adaptable and has 
been able to transform itself in response to current events to survive as an organization.50  
In order to truly understand and visualize the organizational structure of a terrorist 
network, academics began to employ social network analysis (SNA). “Connecting the 
dots” in this way is a difficult task, given that accurate information on network leadership 
and affiliations is generally not available in open source literature. The first attempt to 
substantively apply SNA to a terrorist organization was Valdis Krebs’ analysis of the 
                                                 
46 Bale, Introduction to Terrorism seminar. 
47 Rapoport, Sacred Fury, 107. 
48 Sageman, Leaderless Jihad. 
49 Bruce Hoffman, “The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama bin Laden Still Matters,” 
Foreign Affairs (May/June 2008). 
50 See also Rohan Gunaratna, “Understanding Al Qaeda and its Network in Southeast Asia,” in After 
Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia, eds. Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan (Singapore: 
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2001), 119. 
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9/11 Al Qaeda cell, which he compiled using newspaper articles and other open source 
material.51 Researchers such as Philip Vos Fellman and Roxana Wright, and later J.D. 
Farley, have since validated Krebs’ approach.52 Still, there have been few attempts at the 
substantive application of SNA to a terrorist network. Stuart Koschade examines this 
subject in “A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah,” in which he argues, 
“Despite the potentially profound significance of sociogramatical and social network 
analysis to terrorism studies, there are only a small handful of substantive studies that 
employ such analysis.” Kathleen Carley et al. did one such study, and Carley is known 
for coming up with a new, yet related field: dynamic network analysis.53 Koschade 
applies SNA to the JI cell that was responsible for the 2002 Bali bombings, and 
introduces a potential framework for the intelligence analysis of terrorist cells to assist in 
understanding terrorist cell communication and structure, and predicting behavior.54  
Southeast Asia is an up-and-coming economic region, with many small islands 
and open seas that make trafficking and trading of any kind difficult to police. It has a 
long history of hosting a variety of transnational criminal networks, due in large part to 
the region’s “tourist-friendly policies and minimal visa requirements, generally lax 
financial oversights, well-established informal remittance systems for overseas workers, 
porous borders, often weak central government control, endemic government corruption, 
                                                 
51 Valdis E. Krebs, “Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells,” Connections 24, 3 (2001): 43–52. See 
also: Valdis E. Krebs, “Connecting the Dots: Social Network Analysis of 9/11 Terror Network,” 
http://www.orgnet.com/prevent.html, 2008. 
52 See Philip Vos Fellman and Roxana Wright. “Modeling Terrorist Networks: Complex Systems at 
Mid-Range” (paper prepared for the Joint Complexity Conference, London School of Economics, 
September 16-18, 2003), http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/complexity/Conference/FellmanWright.pdf. Also J. 
Farley. “Breaking al-Qaeda Cells: A Mathematical Analysis of Counterterrorism Operations (A Guide for 
Risk Assessment and Decision Making),” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 26, no. 2 (2003), 399–411. 
53 Kathleen M. Carley at al, “Destabilizing Dynamic Covert Networks” (paper prepared for 
Proceedings of the 8th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, 
National Defense War College, Washington, DC, 2003), and Kathleen M. Carley. Dynamic Network 
Analysis for Counter-Terrorism (Pittsburgh: Carnegie Mellon University, 2005). Also, most recently: 
Kathleen M. Carley, forthcoming, “Dynamic Network Analysis” in the Summary of the NRC workshop on 
Social Network Modeling and Analysis, Ron Breiger and Kathleen M. Carley (Eds.), National Research 
Council. 
54 Stuart Koschade, “A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Applications to 
Counterterrorism and Intelligence,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (2006): 559–575. 
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and a vast supply of illicit arms.”55 The lax infrastructure that facilitates drug, weapons, 
and human trafficking also makes Southeast Asia conducive to terrorist activity. 
Furthermore, the existing underground banking systems (UBS), also known as hawala 
networks, that have long facilitated transnational crime, are also beneficial for terrorist 
groups that launder money in support of their operations.56 UBS are highly personalized, 
family-based networks of trading companies, gold shops, money exchanges, etc., that 
maintain minimal records and rely on a high degree of trust between brokers. The low-
level communication techniques that UBS networks employ virtually guarantee security 
and anonymity, which make them an attractive medium through which financial 
transactions can be made in support of terrorist and criminal activity. It allows those who 
use them to move large amounts of money undetected.57 The price for breaking that trust 
is severe—often ostracism or even death.  
C. CASE STUDY: JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH 
1. Background/History 
Jemaah Islamiyah’s origins extend back as early as the 1960s, when Abu Bakar 
Baasyir and Abdullah Sungkar first began advocating sharia law. It emerged out of the 
Darul Islam movement, which was a separatist movement in the 1950s with the goal of 
establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia.58 Darul Islam employed guerilla tactics against 
both imperial Dutch troops and Sukarno’s secularist Indonesian forces, causing several 
uprisings throughout the 1950s and 60s.59 After it was forced underground during the 
1960s, it inspired several militant organizations to begin to form, one of which was JI. 
                                                 
55 Zachary Abuza, “Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network,” Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 24, no. 3 (December 2002): 429.  
56 Alan Dupont, “Transnational Violence in the Asia-Pacific: An Overview of Current Trends” in 
Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability, ed. 
Paul J. Smith (Armonk, NH: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 10. 
57 Ibid., 10. See also “Money Laundering (UBS),” Burma Debate (February–March 1995): 30–32. 
58 Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, 
Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, & Literature (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2008), 574. 
59 Sukarno was Indonesia’s founding President, who ruled from 1950 to 1965. See Australia 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia (Canberra: 
National Capital Printing, 2004).  
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Jemaah Islamiyah’s co-founders, Abu Bakar Baasyir and Abdullah Sungkar, are the 
ideological heirs of the Darul Islam movement. In the 1970s, they established a Muslim 
boarding school in Solo—the main island of Java in Indonesia—from which many JI 
operatives have graduated. Al Mukmin preaches the strict, puritanical Wahhabi 
interpretation of Islam that was founded and propagated from Saudi Arabia.60 In 1985, 
Baasyir and Sungkar were forced to flee from Solo to Malaysia, where they set up a base 
of operations to train Indonesians and Malaysians to go to Afghanistan, initially to fight 
the Soviets, but later to train in Al Qaeda camps.”61 JI recruits trained in Afghanistan 
from 1985 until the Soviet withdrawal in 1991, where they were schooled in weapons, 
tactics, explosives, and salafist indoctrination.62  
Jemaah Islamiyah was officially formed in either 1993 or 1994, when it began to 
evolve into a sophisticated organizational structure that actively recruited and planned 
terrorist activity in Southeast Asia. Also during the 1990s, JI began formally coordinating 
with Al Qaeda. After the fall of the Suharto regime in Indonesia in 1998, Jemaah 
Islamiyah was able to operate with near impunity. When Baasyir and Sungkar returned to 
Solo from Malaysia, they were able to preach their interpretation of Islam very openly. 
When tensions heated in 1999 and 2000 between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia’s 
outer islands, JI took advantage of the opportunity to train, recruit, and fund local 
mujahedin fighters in the sectarian conflict, who later became active JI members.63  
2. Motivation 
Jemaah Islamiyah is motivated by ideology. Its mission is to establish sharia law 
in Indonesia. According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), JI has the “unambiguous 
goal” of establishing a pan-Islamic state in Southeast Asia.64 It threatens the status quo by 
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seeking to overthrow the existing secular governments in Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
southern Philippines and southern Thailand. While JI’s use of terrorism as a tactic has 
been in support of this objective, today their motivation appears more ambiguous.  
In recent years, JI’s most visible terrorist activities—the simultaneous bombings 
on the Ritz Carlton and Marriott hotels in Jakarta in July 2009, and the 2002 and 2005 
Bali bombings—have been focused on Western targets, which seems to contradict their 
mission statement. A recent CRS report on “Terrorism in Southeast Asia” notes that 
Southeast Asian terrorist and militant groups vary across a wide spectrum, from those 
with relatively narrow goals, like the separatist Muslims in southern Thailand and the 
southern Philippines, all the way to those with a global, anti-Western agenda, like Al 
Qaeda. JI falls somewhere in between that spectrum, and appears to be having an internal 
debate over to what extent their emphasis is on achieving an Islamist agenda within 
individual Southeast Asian states versus fighting directly against Western targets.65 
Given their known affiliation with Al Qaeda, many question whether their focus on 
Western targets is a result of Al Qaeda’s growing influence or part of JI’s shifting 
internal agenda. It is also possible that there is a schism among JI members about what 
exactly their objectives are.  
3. Organizational Structure 
In 1993, Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar instructed Hambali—a long-
time Al Qaeda operative in Southeast Asia—to establish a network of militant cells in the 
region. Based out of Indonesia, JI is believed to have anywhere from 200 to 2,000 
members, led by a central command structure. It is thought to be structured much like Al 
Qaeda, with a central command, a hard core of dedicated jihadists, and a wider associate 
base that draws from established militant organizations and radical groups in the region.66 
Hambali was the first chairman of JI’s five-member Regional Advisory Council (RAC), 
or shurah. Hambali appointed several lieutenants below the RAC to establish cells in 
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their respective countries: the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Each cell 
then has several of its own sub-cells, or fiah. JI was deliberately set up as a military 
organization, and is divided into mantiqis and wakalas, which are actually territorial 
command structures of brigades, battalions, companies, platoons and squads.67 These 
cells are relatively independent of one another, serving different functions because they 
exploit their individual demographics, socioeconomic, socio-political and geographical 
attributes. Mantiqi 1 covers Singapore, Malaysia (except Sabeh), and southern Thailand. 
Mantiqi 2 covers Indonesia (except Sulawesi and Kalimantan). Mantiqi 3 covers Sabah, 
Sulawesi, Kalimantan, and the southern Philippines. Mantiqi 4 covers Australia and 
Papua New Guinea.68 
The Malaysian cell has an estimated 200 members—the largest of the JI network. 
It has approximately five discernible functions. First, it has been a liaison between JI and 
the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM), with which there is considerable overlap in 
membership, and as a conduit between JI and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. It was the 
logistical hub for dispatching JI operatives to Afghanistan for training (approximately 
1,000 JI operatives from Southeast Asia were sent to Afghanistan for this purpose).69 
Second, it was responsible for establishing front companies that could be used to channel 
Al Qaeda funds and to procure weapons and bomb-making material. Third, the Malaysian 
cell was the center of the Maluku jihad activities, procuring automatic weapons from the 
Philippines and southern Thailand. Fourth, it was responsible for procuring large 
quantities of ammonium nitrate—a chemical fertilizer used in bombs that is readily 
available in Malaysia. Finally, it ran a camp in southern Malaysia to be used by both the 
Malaysian and Singapore cells for training new recruits.70  
The Philippine cell is a major logistics cell for the JI network, responsible for the 
procurement of guns, explosives and other equipment. The Philippine cell also has 
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connections to Al Qaeda because it was led by Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi (alias Mike), 
who was recruited by a member of the RAC (Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana) into Al Qaeda 
after studying in a Pakistani madrasah from 1990 to 1995.71 While training in 
Afghanistan between 1993 and 1994, al-Ghozi was introduced to several members of the 
MILF. He was then sent to the Philippines to establish contacts with them from 1995 to 
1996 and to set up a JI cell. The Philippine cell may have also served as a conduit for 
financial transfers to JI. It was instrumental in arranging the training of JI and KMM 
members in MILF camps, and as a conduit for JI contributions to the MILF.72 
The Indonesian cell is the most mysterious of the JI mantiqis. It is connected to 
Abu Bakar Bashir’s MMI, which is the key liaison between Bashir and the JI regional 
network.73 Bashir was the spiritual leader of JI, or amir. Below the amir is the secretary 
(Fikri Sugundo)—a close lieutenant and master of the elementary school of the Al 
Mikmin pesantren. Experts believe that Irfan Suryahardy Awwas was the most likely 
leader of the Indonesian cell until his arrest after the Marriott Hotel bombing in 2003.74 
Awwas was the director of the MMI and is in regular contact with radicals in the 
organization. Also the chairman of Hiddyatullah Press and Wihdah press—two MMI-
owned publishing houses that produce radical Islamic texts and anti-American and anti-
Zionist propaganda.75 The Indonesian cell has been the most important cell since the 
Malaysian and Singapore governments arrested JI cell members in their countries, forcing 
many of their remaining members to flee to Indonesia where the JI network has 
consolidated and expanded.  
The Singapore cell was the JI network’s major operational unit in Southeast Asia, 
responsible for planning and coordinating attacks. Ibrahim Maidin established the 
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Singapore cell after he took an oath of allegiance to Bashir.76 Maidin had no formal 
religious training but was schooled by Bashir, Hambali, Sungkar and Abu Jibril. Trained 
in Afghanistan in 1993, he recruited most of the members of the Singapore cell through a 
religious class that he taught at private residences.77 The Singapore cell was small—
around 80 members—and extremely secretive.78 It was not discovered until late 2001, 
and over the course of that next year, nearly half of its members were arrested, severely 
constraining its operational ability. Importantly, the Singapore JI members were mostly 
educated, middle-class men with no prior radical Islamic leanings. The Singapore cell 
had five functional units: operations, security, missionary work, fund-raising, and 
communications. Below, there were three sub-cells, each of which was responsible for 
surveilling different targets: Fiah Ayub, Fiah Musa and Fiah Ismail. Almost all of the 
plans for the Singapore cell’s attacks were at an operational stage just before the cell was 
disbanded.79 
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Figure 1.   Jemaah Islamiyah Graph—Depiction of Group Involved with Bali  
Operation, 6–11 October 200280 
In SNA terms, JI is a small-world, random network. Above is a sociograph of the 
JI group that carried out the Bali operation in Indonesia based on Stuart Koschade’s 
analysis using UCInet Version 6.85 software. A sociograph is a visual representation of a 
network developed through graph theory, in which the actors are represented by nodes, 
and their relationships are represented by links, or lines. It is clear from this image that 
Samudra was the key link, or broker, in the JI network. In SNA, a “broker” makes a 
connection where there would not otherwise be one. Koschade verified this by carefully 
calculating the network’s size, density, degree of connexion, centrality, closeness, 
betweenness and clusters using SNA algorithms. He determined that Samudra and Idris 
were the most important individuals in the cell, specifically because of their high 
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centrality scores.81 He also determined that because of this cell’s high density and degree 
of connection, its structural focus put more emphasis on efficiency and was less covert 
(more C2 and less OPSEC, as discussed above).82 This kind of analysis can help inform 
intelligence analysts, law enforcement and policymakers because of its predictive 
application. Still, important information cannot be coded for. For instance, members of 
this operation communicated using code words and Balinese aliases. Also of interest is 
that the main form of communication between each section and Samudra was via text 
messaging, or SMS.83 This kind of information is an important supplement to SNA that 
helps provide a more complete picture of the network. 
4. Sources and Patterns of Funding 
JI is funded from multiple sources, although funding from Al Qaeda has received 
the most attention. JI collects contributions from both internal members and outside 
supporters, much of which is brought into the country in cash. Before it was disbanded, 
the Singapore cell collected a set percentage of member salaries each year (an estimated 2 
to 5 percent), of which about a quarter was transferred to the Malaysian cell and another 
quarter to the Indonesian cell—all carried on hand by individuals.84 JI skims funds from 
Islamic charities and launders money through corporate entities, some legitimate 
businesses and some dedicated front companies for terrorist activities. The Malaysian cell 
established front companies to channel Al Qaeda funds, four of which are known to have 
been run by Al Qaeda in Malaysia: Konsojaya, Green Laboratory Medicine, Infocus 
Techology and Secure Valley.85 JI profits from gold and gem smuggling, petty crime,  
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racketeering, extortion, gun running and kidnapping.86 It receives funds from hawala 
shops and through Al Qaeda investments and accounts, particularly those in the Islamic 
banking system.  
In 2001, the U.S. State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism estimated that 
JI was primarily self-financed, with some support from Al Qaeda.87 Hambali’s arrest in 
2003 shed more light on this relationship, as he was the critical link between JI and Al 
Qaeda. After his arrest, Indonesian investigators learned that Al Qaeda’s financial and 
logistical support of JI had been growing, although it is not clear whether that is 
indicative of greater ideological collaboration between the groups. Southeast Asia is an 
important financial center for Al Qaeda, which relied on this region to set up front 
companies, fundraise, recruit, forge documents, and purchase weapons prior to JI’s 
creation.88 Southeast Asia’s business-friendly trade laws, network of Islamic charities, 
and poorly regulated Islamic banks made it an ideal location to establish business.  
5. Network Overlap 
a. Overlap With Other Terrorist Networks 
Traditionally, linkages between indigenous Islamic militant groups in 
Southeast Asia focused mainly on domestic issues like promoting sharia law or 
independence from central government control. JI is known to have links to other terrorist 
networks—Al Qaeda in particular. The relationship between Al Qaeda and JI is believed 
to date back to the mid-1990s, and has been a subject of much debate since 9/11. JI has 
been referred to as Al Qaeda’s regional affiliate. Zachary Abuza argues that “JI is a 
perfect example of how Al Qaeda has penetrated the region.” Though JI has a regional 
agenda, it is “an important cog in the Al Qaeda network,” and was probably being 
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enlarged and strengthened before 9/11.89 Recent reports, including leaked interrogations 
from captured JI and Al Qaeda operatives, have demonstrated that JI and Al Qaeda are 
discreet organizations with agendas that differ, but overlap.90 Al Qaeda has funded the 
activities of JI spiritual leaders; provided training for JI operatives in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan and elsewhere; provided trainers and experts at the local level; financed regional 
operational activities; and provided logistical support, including weapons and explosives. 
Al Qaeda has also allegedly requested JI conduct regional operations on its behalf.91 
There are a number of other bonds that tie JI to Al Qaeda, including shared combat, 
religious and training experiences in Afghanistan, Pakistan or Mindanao; the provision of 
sanctuary for wanted individuals; meetings between activists to exchange views; regional 
groups’ support for Al Qaeda operations.92 
Beginning in mid-1999, Al Qaeda financier Omar Al-Farouq, also known 
as Mahmoud bin Ahmad Assegaf, organized a series of joint JI-Al Qaeda bombings that 
were carried out in Indonesia, culminating in the Christmas 2000 bombings.93 After 9/11, 
he planned a series of attacks on U.S. targets across Southeast Asia, including a seaborne 
suicide attack on U.S. naval vessels that were in Surabaya in May 2002 for joint training 
operations. He allegedly recruited a Somali Al Qaeda operative to lead the attack, but was 
unable to recruit enough personnel to carry it out. He was also allegedly instructed by two 
senior Al Qaeda officials to carry out a series of truck bombings on U.S. embassies in 
Southeast Asia on or around the anniversary of 9/11, but he was arrested and turned over 
to the Americans before he could carry them out.94 
JI also has discernible ties to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 
the Southern Philippines. Philippine cell leader Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi was responsible 
for liaising with the MILF. JI had its own training camp in Camp Abu Bakar, the MILF’s 
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headquarters joint training ground for MILF and JI personnel in bomb making.95 The 
Philippine cell was an instrumental conduit for financial transfers from JI to the MILF.96 
The MILF has categorically denied that it ever forged tactical alliances with JI, Abu 
Sayyaf or Al Qaeda.97 However, there is evidence that certain MILF factions have 
maintained links with JI, which have allegedly carried out operations and provided refuge 
and training for JI operatives.98 
Noordin Mohammed Top drew from the JI network to create his own 
radical splinter group, which he grandly referred to as the Al Qaeda of the Maylay 
Archipelago. Noordin’s network is a deviant offshoot of JI, but JI members comprised 
the core of his following. Implicated in the Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta in August 
2003, the Australian Embassy bombing in September 2004, the 2005 bombings in Bali, 
and the simultaneous bombings on Jakarta’s Marriott and Ritz Carlton hotels in July 
2009, Noordin earned himself the title of South Asia’s most wanted terrorist until he was 
killed by authorities in September 2009.99 Despite the clear overlap in membership and 
association between JI and Noordin’s group, it is evident that Noordin was personally 
motivated and that JI, as an organization, did not support his activities.100 
b. Overlap With Dissimilar Networks 
JI is funded, in large part, by its overlap with regional criminal networks. 
It engages in petty crime, smuggling, money laundering, racketeering, etc., in support of 
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its terrorist operations. As Tamara Makarenko argues in “Terrorism and Transnational 
Crime,” in unstable regions like Southeast Asia, it is in the interest of terrorist and 
criminal groups to form alliances that secure an environment conducive to their mutual 
needs.101 She writes, “Although terrorist groups engaging in criminal activities in the 
other regions of the world have a tendency to focus on highly sophisticated and thus 
lucrative smuggling operations, many Southeast Asian groups tend to focus on crimes 
that are generally classified as low to medium in sophistication.”102 For instance, JI has 
been implicated in bank and jewelry shop robberies. While JI makes use of regional 
criminal networks, and piggybacks off of Al Qaeda’s front companies and money 
laundering schemes, it does so to the extent that it benefits its terrorist activities, and not 
because it is morphing into a more profitable, sophisticated criminal organization. 
c. Nature of Network Overlap 
While there are clear links between JI, Al Qaeda, and other regional 
terrorist networks, these links differ in their nature and intensity.103 The connection 
between Al Qaeda and JI may be more for Al Qaeda’s benefit than for JI’s. From Al 
Qaeda’s perspective, this link helps extend their global reach throughout Southeast Asia 
and to the Muslim community—particularly important in Indonesia, the largest Muslim 
nation and fourth most populous nation in the world. From JI’s perspective, this link 
provides financial support, which benefits their motivations and terrorist activities. It is 
not clear that JI has adopted Al Qaeda’s global worldview, but it is probably fair to say 
that when JI is successful in its local agenda—for instance, the bombings in Bali and 
Jakarta—its efforts fit broadly into Al Qaeda’s global agenda. This makes the alliance 
mutually beneficial.  
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It is likely that certain individuals in JI have been co-opted by Al Qaeda’s 
worldview, but unlikely that JI’s motivation as an organization has fundamentally 
changed. Abu Bakar Bashir and Hambali, for instance, appear to have been personally 
motivated to interact with Al Qaeda beyond what benefitted JI as an organization. After 
the Bali bombings in 2002, Al Qaeda apparently rewarded Hambali directly with 
approximately $100,000 to use at his own discretion for future attacks.104 Noordin 
Mohammed Top is another outlier. While his JI connections are strong, Noordin’s 
admiration of Al Qaeda and personal desire to carry out attacks against Western targets 
were largely outside of JI’s regional objectives. His attacks may have actually been 
detrimental to JI as an organization because they resulted in the arrest of nearly 300 
network members, severely constraining JI’s operational ability. Still, even Hambali—the 
main link between JI and Al Qaeda, who allegedly had personal access to Mohamed 
Atef—never achieved any formal status with Al Qaeda, which has been described as 
xenophobic, with no non-Arabs in its central leadership.105 
Clive Williams contends that Al Qaeda-linked Islamic extremist groups 
and individuals can be affiliated, associated, empathetic, or representative. “Affiliated” 
groups are generally recognized as part of the Al Qaeda network. “Associated” groups 
and individuals receive support from Al Qaeda, but are basically free actors (e.g., Ramzi 
Yousef). “Empathetic” groups are driven by local issues and have only marginal 
association with Al Qaeda (e.g., Gerakan Aceh Merdeka in Indonesia). “Representatives” 
are regionally-based Al Qaeda ambassadors, cell members and sleepers (e.g., Omar Al-
Faruq).106 JI is most likely an associated network of Al Qaeda but, as Kumar 
Ramakrishna writes, “JI is an autonomous network with its own agenda that is well 
capable of executing its own operations without reference to Osama bin Laden.”107 In 
other words, while JI is linked to Al Qaeda through some joint membership, financial 
support, and expertise, it still has its own agenda and is not subordinate to Al Qaeda.  
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D. CONCLUSION 
A major problem in U.S. counterterrorism policy is that it is often focused too 
heavily on decapitation. U.S. and regional security officials often believe that the 
kill/capture of top leaders in a terrorist network will degrade organizations like JI or Al 
Qaeda to the point of collapse. There is sound logic behind the targeting of the most 
important, or central, network members (which SNA is useful for identifying), but 
analysts must also take into consideration the fact that these networks have proven adept 
at replacing their leadership and developing new C2 structures when circumstances 
require it. After raids across Southeast Asia began to arrest JI operatives in December 
2001, JI’s operational capability was damaged but still quite effective at prosecuting 
significant terrorist attacks, like the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings and the 2009 Jakarta 
hotel bombings. Additionally, policymakers and counterterrorism analysts must not focus 
on a particular well-known terrorist network (e.g., Al Qaeda) at the exclusion of other 
groups. Other regional and international terrorist groups, like JI and the MILF, are 
critically important to prosecuting a global counterterrorism campaign. Furthermore, 
analysts must consider the possibility of sprouting splinter groups, for instance that of 
Noordin Top, which was responsible for carrying out several recent large-scale attacks 
that were (perhaps falsely) attributed more broadly to JI. As Matthew Levitt argues, 
“Failure to understand the crossover and cooperation between international terrorist 
groups has already undermined efforts to prosecute the war on terror.108 
Disrupting a terrorist network requires getting at what Abuza refers to as the 
“institutions of terror,” which include their infrastructure, funding, and the safe-havens 
from which they plan, train and execute attacks. Terrorist financing is the key to counter-
network activity. Shutting down front companies and charities will go a long way toward 
curtailing logistical support and stemming the flow of funds to and among terrorist 
groups.109 Money laundering has posed an increasingly difficult challenge since after 
9/11, when the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) began 
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using its Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to track down terrorist financing. Since 
then, the FATF has put Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines on its blacklist for money- 
laundering states.110 No matter how many bank accounts the international community 
freezes, or how many front companies are shut down, terrorist groups will always find 
other sources of funding, because they are clever, flexible and adaptable. While we 
cannot defeat terrorism, in the words of Matthew Levitt, “Bringing the phenomenon of 
terrorism back down to tolerable levels is a very attainable goal.”111 
The key to countering global terrorist networks is in a global response. 
Coordinated, international responses are especially difficult in regions like Southeast 
Asia where multinational institutions and cooperation are weak. One prevailing challenge 
in combating global extremism today is the rise of anti-American sentiment in the post-
9/11 era. Propelled by the U.S.-led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the 
perception among many Muslims of the U.S. stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it 
difficult for governments of primarily Islamic states to justify “an overt U.S. role in their 
internal security.”112 Southeast Asian states—and other friendly nations that host terrorist 
activity—must balance their counterterrorism efforts with careful domestic political 
considerations. The challenge for U.S. counterterrorism efforts, over the coming years, 
will be to find a way to confront terrorist elements within these nations but without 
turning them into heroes or martyrs in the broader Islamic community, and to garner 
support from their governments in such a manner that it does not compromise their power 
or influence domestically.  
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III. PROLIFERATION NETWORKS: A.Q. KHAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. Why Proliferation Networks Are Important 
Proliferation networks are developed to procure and/or sell sensitive materials and 
technologies for any covert weapons program. Though the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) only officially recognizes five nuclear weapons states—the United States, 
United Kingdom, France, Russia and China—Israel, Pakistan, India and now North 
Korea are all non-signatory members of the nuclear club that had to look outside the 
international security regime for their weapons procurement.113 The short list of nuclear 
weapons states is an apparent success in light of President Kennedy’s grave prediction in 
1963 that, by 1990, over 20 nations around the world would have nuclear weapons. Still, 
the proliferation of nuclear technology to even a few states has had a ripple effect of 
repercussions. A major consequence of Pakistan’s uranium program was the creation of 
the A.Q. Khan network, which leveraged the contacts and expertise used to establish 
Pakistan’s program into a profitable export business. Khan sold nuclear materials, 
technologies and possibly bomb designs to Iran, North Korea, and Libya, which 
dismantled its program after the Khan network was disrupted in 2003.  
In spite of the Libya success story, Iran and North Korea continue to pursue 
covert nuclear weapons programs in violation of their responsibilities to the NPT and 
IAEA statutes, among other things. North Korea is alleged to have assisted Syria and 
possibly Myanmar in their nuclear aspirations—perhaps even to the extent of A.Q. 
Khan.114 Furthermore, there is growing concern that non-state actors also desire nuclear  
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technology, for which they would be expected to rely on covert procurement methods to 
achieve. Osama bin Laden, for instance, has explicitly referred to the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons as a “religious duty” for Al Qaeda. 
Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), therefore, is 
a top U.S. national security objective. The WMD Commission Report recommended the 
establishment of the National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC) to address this specific 
challenge in 2005.115 The most recent National Intelligence Strategy (NIS)—put out by 
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence—ranks it as the second most important 
mission objective for the intelligence community (IC), right after combating violent 
extremism. The NIS dedicates the IC to countering WMD proliferation and their means 
of delivery by state and non-state actors, and prioritizes five policy objectives for doing 
so: to dissuade, prevent, roll back, deter, and manage consequences nuclear 
proliferation.116 The Department of Defense’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 
focuses its assessment, in large part, on preventing proliferation and countering WMD.117 
DoD also publishes the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which is a roadmap for reducing 
nuclear risks to the United States, its allies and partners, and the international 
community.118 The NPT Review conference that took place in New York City this year 
renewed discussion over an updated Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) to reduce 
U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles. These developments, particularly within the context 
of growing concern over covert programs in Iran and North Korea, demonstrate that 
nuclear nonproliferation and counterproliferation are foremost in the minds of 
policymakers, military leadership, and the intelligence community alike. Deeper 
understanding of proliferation networks supports U.S. efforts in each category.  
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2. Why the A. Q. Khan Network Was Chosen as a Case Study 
There is perhaps no better modern-day example of a proliferation network than 
Abdul Qadeer Khan’s nuclear enterprise. Originally tasked by the Pakistan government to 
procure materials for its state nuclear weapons program, Khan used his access to nuclear 
suppliers and dual-use materials around the globe to create a profitable export business, 
providing information, technology, and expertise to countries that wanted it in exchange 
for a high profit. When U.S. and British agents finally brought down his notorious 
proliferation network, Khan and his gang had already spread centrifuge technology (and 
bomb designs) to Iran, North Korea, Libya, and perhaps others. Mohammed El-Baradei, 
former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), described the A.Q. 
Khan network as a virtual Walmart of private sector proliferation—a reference to the 
“one-stop shopping” service Khan provided nuclear-aspirant nations.119 Gordon Corera, 
who wrote an extensive account of Khan’s nefarious activities, concluded, “A.Q. Khan 
has had a greater impact on nuclear proliferation than any other individual in the last 
three decades.”120 Former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), George 
Tenet, described Khan as “at least as dangerous as Osama bin Laden.”121  
3. Roadmap 
This chapter begins with a brief explanation of the proliferation network typology, 
examining the prevailing literature on proliferation to draw conclusions about 
proliferation networks in general. I then examine the A.Q. Khan network as a case study. 
I ask the same questions of the Khan network that I did of Jemaah Islamiyah in the 
previous chapter, focusing on its motivation, structure, sources and patterns of funding, 
overlap with other procurement networks, overlap with different types of criminal  
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activity, and what the nature of that overlap was in each case. I conclude by offering 
recommendations for how the implications of these findings can inform ongoing 
counterproliferation efforts.  
B. PROLIFERATION NETWORK TYPOLOGY 
Procurement networks are designed to procure sensitive materials and technology 
for any covert weapons program. Network activities can be either overt or covert, and 
often blur the line between. The prevalence of dual-use commodities in chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons programs make WMD 
procurement networks unique from other types of trafficking networks. The nature of the 
materials and technologies required are inherently difficult to regulate because they have 
both civilian and military applications. Many items do not require export control 
licensing, and those that do can be acquired under numerous false pretenses. For 
example, two of the main items trafficked by the Khan network were valves and vacuum 
pumps—required for uranium enrichment plants but also used in the oil industry. The 
combination of front companies, middlemen, transshipment points, and well-falsified 
end-user certificates makes it exceedingly difficult to determine which application the 
items in any given shipment are intended for. Furthermore, profit and global supply-chain 
pressures (for instance, “just in time” inventory practices) give exporters a strong 
financial incentive to minimize delays through customs, and directs them toward ports 
and hubs where this kind of enforcement is more lax (e.g., Dubai).  
The ultimate goal of a nuclear procurement network is to acquire the ingredients 
for a nuclear weapons program on behalf of an end user who desires the power and 
international prestige associated with WMD. Actors in a procurement network are 
generally businessmen and are therefore motivated by profit. They are almost always 
unarmed—not dedicated to anything but their own profit, and therefore unwilling to 
engage in violence in support of their activities. These actors can be either witting or 
unwitting: some purposefully engaged for money, ideology or prestige; some willing to 
turn a blind eye for a profit; and some taken advantage of without knowing their products 
are going toward nefarious activities. Asher Karni is an example of a witting participant, 
purely motivated by profit, and uninterested in the social or political implications of 
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Pakistan’s nuclear aspirations. Karni, an Israeli citizen living in South Africa, was 
arrested in 2004 for re-exporting U.S.-made trigger spark gaps and oscilloscopes from 
South Africa to Pakistan.122 He was the owner and sales director of Top-Cape 
Technology in Cape Town, South Africa, which advertised on its website its ability to 
acquire “civilian and military electronic goods.”123 The U.S. Government’s Sentencing 
Memorandum against Karni noted that, in addition to Pakistan, he also procured items for 
entities affiliated with India, Russia, China and Israel’s nuclear weapons and missile 
programs.124  
The literature on the structure of procurement networks characterizes them as 
stars, cliques, and rings. It breaks them down into primary and secondary proliferators, 
and addresses the differences between supply networks, demand networks, and the 
middlemen in between. For years, proliferation experts have described covert nuclear 
procurement as a black market activity. Former nonproliferation official, Mark 
Fitzpatrick, defines this as “the trade in nuclear-related technologies, components, or 
materials that is pursued for non-peaceful purposes and most often by secretive 
means.”125 Conventional wisdom today is that proliferation networks exist primarily 
within the “gray” market, dabbling in legitimate and illegitimate enterprises alike, as 
much of the commodities they trade are dual-use. The relationships between actors are 
transactional, and successful networks, such as that of A.Q. Khan, rely on relationships of 
trust built over time. There is no one-size-fits-all typology for proliferation networks.  
Alexander Montgomery applies the three main simple network structures to 
procurement networks, noting that the “star” is and will continue to be the most common 
structure in proliferation networks. In a “ring” network, connections between nodes form 
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a circle. A “clique” is a dense network, in which each node is connected to every other 
node. The “star,” or “hub-and-spoke” network is most commonly associated with 
procurement networks. In this structure, every node is connected through a central “hub” 
(see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2.   Simple Network Structures126 
This has important implications for counter-network activity, which would wisely 
attempt to isolate the central node in order to bring down or counter the effectiveness of 
the network. The problem with these three simple structures is that proliferation networks 
are not simple. There are supply and demand-oriented networks to consider, each with 
different motivations. There are both state and non-state actors. There are witting and 
unwitting contributors, and there are many actors in between.  
Chaim Braun and Christopher Chyba’s article “Proliferation Rings” presents three 
interrelated challenges to the nuclear nonproliferation regime: latent proliferation, first-
tier proliferation, and second-tier proliferation.127 Latent proliferation is when a country 
appears to adhere to its formal obligations under the NPT in its civil nuclear program, 
while covertly developing the capabilities for a nuclear weapons program. Iran’s illicit 
weapons program is a good case study for latent proliferation. First-tier proliferation is 
                                                 
126 Alexander Montgomery, “Proliferation Networks in Theory and Practice,” Strategic Insights V, no. 
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when technology or material that is sold or stolen from private companies or state 
programs assists non-nuclear weapons states in illicitly developing nuclear weapons and 
delivery systems. North Korea is now thought to be engaging in first-tier proliferation, 
allegedly assisting Syria and possibly Myanmar in their nuclear weapons aspirations.128 
Second-tier proliferation occurs when states trade among themselves to boost one 
another’s nuclear weapons programs.129 Second-tier proliferation, centered on Pakistan’s 
uranium enrichment program, is believed to have exacerbated the threat of latent 
proliferation in North Korea, Iran, Libya and possibly others.130 Braun and Chyba coined 
the term “proliferation rings” in reference to the networks of second-tier proliferators that 
are able to develop clandestine programs because of the ready exchange of nuclear 
weapons-related and missile technologies among developing nations.131 Increased 
interaction enables opportunities for illicit exchanges between network participants, as 
was the case with North Korea’s missile-for-enrichment deal with Pakistan. “Ring” 
members interact either directly (at the state-to-state level) or indirectly (through once-
removed private sector supplier networks).132 Proliferation rings can be further broken 
down to supply and demand—supply being the “push” and demand the “pull” for a 
nuclear weapons program.  
Demand networks are generally traditional star networks, in which the central 
node is the state or non-state actor that desires (has a “demand” for) nuclear weapons. 
While this thesis focuses on nuclear weapons procurement, it is important to note that 
other WMD procurement networks are similarly shaped—both nuclear and non-nuclear. 
Jonathan Tucker examines the procurement networks of Iran and Iraq during the Iran-Iraq 
war, when both countries acquired chemical weapons (CW) precursors for their 
programs. Frans van Anraat of the Netherlands and Peter Walaschek of Germany acted as 
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the central “hubs” for Iraq and Iran’s programs, respectively.133 While these cases are 
over two decades old, they provide important insights for procurement networks today, 
because the methods have not fundamentally changed. While there are (some) more 
export controls today than in the 1980s, globalization and the liberalization of the 
international marketplace have also broadened opportunities for offshore accounting, 
transshipment, false end-users, middlemen and front companies. Similarly, CBRN 
weapons, alike, require dual-use commodities, which have proven difficult for states—
caught between competing profit and nonproliferation interests—to regulate.  
As in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, the procurement networks for Iran and 
Iraq’s CW programs attempted to disguise the true purpose and destination of their dual-
use items. They made use of greedy businessmen, front companies, banks, and third-
country brokers. They falsified end-user certificates, financed transactions with forged 
Letters of Credit, and took advantage of bank secrecy laws.134 They transshipped goods 
coming from the United States and other places through third, fourth and fifth countries 
to conceal their final destination.135 They weaved through the holes in export controls, 
and suffered limited penalties, if any, when implicated in the illicit transfer of dual-use 
materials and technologies. Iraq and Iran were willing to pay top dollar for their 
materials, offering commissions much higher than what was normal at the time.136 Each 
intermediary required payment or commission, so everybody profited. Those involved 
were motivated by greed: Van Anraat rationalized his involvement in Iraq’s procurement 
program by arguing that if the weapons were to be bought from somewhere, why should 
he not profit from it?137 Though successful, they were also flawed by design—destined to 
foil because, blinded by greed, the hubris and audacity on which they were based could 
                                                 
133 Tucker, “Trafficking Networks,” 1.  
134 A letter of credit is a financial instrument in international trade that involves a commitment by the 
importer’s bank to transfer payment to the exporter’s bank after the goods have been delivered as specified 
in the contract. While this method of payment leaves a paper trail, and is therefore not considered ideal for 
illicit transactions, it was likely used in order to guarantee prompt payment (see Tucker, “Trafficking 
Networks,” 7).   
135 In these cases, goods were transshipped through European ports. Tucker, “Trafficking Networks,” 
9. 
136 Ibid., 6.   
137 Ibid., 25.  
 45
not pan out in the long term. But with large profits and light penalties, what is to deter a 
future proliferator from following a similar model—or worse, expanding on it?  
Every nuclear weapons state established its program through procurement 
networks. All members of the nuclear club, and even countries with dismantled 
programs, such as Libya and South Africa, procured nuclear materials and technology for 
their state weapons programs using varying degrees of gray market activity. Bruno 
Grussell, the author of “Proliferation Networks and Financing,” argues that while state 
demand has primarily been the driving force behind proliferation, the structure of the 
networks designed to satisfy this demand is new, and changing.138 He contends that 
network structures are made possible by three factors: (1) increased trade flow and lax 
import/export laws, which allow networks to conceal themselves in ways that are difficult 
to monitor; (2) the prevalence of dual-use commodities, which makes it easier for 
networks to hide their true intent; and (3) the appearance of suppliers that are capable and 
willing to transfer materials and technologies.139 
Today, export controls and international agreements such as the NPT make it 
difficult for nuclear aspirant nations to establish their state programs. Increasingly, they 
rely on gray market transfers and private sector transactions to procure individual parts, 
like valves and vacuum pumps, rather than whole units. The networks that supply these 
programs consist of other states, businesses, and individuals that have dual-use 
commodities or nuclear expertise. They often involve the same actors as a demand 
network, and include a wide range of “nodes” in places like the UAE, Malaysia, China, 
South Africa, Germany, the United States and other industrialized countries. Professor 
James Russell of the Naval Postgraduate School posits that the distinctions between the 
supply and demand aspects of nuclear weapons proliferation will become increasingly  
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blurred in future proliferation networks—as was the case with A.Q. Khan.140 The 
international community, therefore, has an increasingly daunting task in countering illicit 
WMD procurement networks.  
C. CASE STUDY: THE A.Q. KHAN PROLIFERATION NETWORK 
The A.Q. Khan network utilized the private sector for Pakistan’s state nuclear 
weapons program. The genius of the Khan network was not simply that he was able to 
procure nuclear weapons for Pakistan, which many believed lacked the resources and 
technical know-how to do so. The Khan network was unique in that it challenged the 
traditional state-centric procurement model because it was both supply and demand-
oriented. It was the first network to demonstrate that it could transform itself from 
procurement to proliferation. The Khan network operated independently—essentially as a 
non-state actor. It was, for all intents and purposes, an autonomous corporation that 
offered one-stop shopping for nuclear materials, technology and expertise. It established 
a new business model that helped Iran, North Korea and Libya develop the expertise and 
infrastructure to produce weapons-grade nuclear materials—piece by piece, one step at a 
time. North Korea appears to be replicating this new model, which is cause for concern 
on every continent and demands immediate attention on national and international levels.  
Sometimes referred to as the Walmart of nuclear proliferation, Khan’s network 
demonstrated to the world that states no longer had a monopoly on nuclear weapons 
programs. Because this kind of procurement inevitably deals in the gray zone of dual-use 
commodities that have both civilian and military applications, the acquisition of a nuclear 
weapons program could be broken down into disparate parts, where valves, vacuum 
pumps, and all of the other materials could be purchased one piece at a time for 
seemingly legitimate purposes. Khan’s success proved that a non-state actor—and in 
particular a trained metallurgist, with no specific expertise in nuclear physics—could  
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buy, sell, and trade materials and technologies on the international marketplace just as 
easily, if not easier, than the state itself. It confirmed that when profit trumps 
nonproliferation concerns, everything is for sale.  
1. Background/History 
Khan got his start in the Netherlands at the Physical Dynamics Research 
Laboratory (FDO) in 1972, just one year after he received his PhD in metallurgy in 
Louvain, Belgium. FDO was a subcontractor of Ultra Centrifuge Nederland (UCN), 
which was the Dutch wing of URENCO. Established in 1971, URENCO was the 
international consortium consisting of the United Kingdom, Germany, and the 
Netherlands at the forefront of Europe’s attempts to develop advanced centrifuge 
technology. Its goal was to generate its own supply of nuclear power through enriched 
uranium that would make them independent from the United States.141 Though this 
technology was intended for civilian nuclear energy purposes, it could easily be used for 
a military weapons program.  
Khan started at exactly the time when FDO was beginning to introduce the “latest, 
most advanced nuclear technology.”142 Because they were competing with their British 
and German counterparts, FDO’s demand for qualified engineers and scientists 
overshadowed concerns over latent proliferation at the time. Khan was able to obtain a 
security clearance for his job in the Netherlands, which allowed him easy access to 
sensitive information that he later funneled into his covert nuclear site in Kahuta, 
Pakistan. Along with the blueprints for producing centrifuges, Khan acquired names and 
developed relationships with the European suppliers involved in the multinational 
uranium enrichment program. This list formed the basis for his original network. Over 
the next few years, Khan stole the URENCO technology and transplanted it to Pakistan, 
where he promised its leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, that he would produce highly enriched 
uranium suitable for weapons before the scientists of Pakistan’s Atomic Energy 
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Commission (PAEC) could succeed in producing a bomb through the alternative route, 
using plutonium. KRL’s intense rivalry with PAEC meant that Pakistan’s networks 
experienced a period of rapid expansion through the 1970s and early 1980s. 
Khan and his associates became masters at manipulating the “gray” market, which 
exists between licit and illicit enterprises. Rather than attempting to purchase a “turnkey” 
enrichment program, he utilized his contacts from URENCO and his knowledge of the 
companies that supplied centrifuge parts and bought them directly. He created or used 
front companies in Pakistan, Dubai, Europe and elsewhere that would make the purchase 
and/or act as a false end-user, and through which he could transship commodities to 
Pakistan when export laws prevented the companies from directly sending it. Procuring 
sensitive technologies through middlemen had two major benefits: first, with more 
players involved, it was more difficult to trace the transactions, and second, profit-driven 
suppliers were unlikely to be concerned over where their dual-use commodities would 
end up.  
2. Motivation 
Pakistan’s motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities were fairly 
straightforward: its neighbor and rival, India, was already equipped with nuclear 
weapons. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto vowed, after India’s nuclear test in May 1974, that Pakistan 
would “eat grass” if it had to in order to meet India’s nuclear threat. Khan’s personal 
motivations for establishing his elaborate network are less clear. There is speculation 
about whether he was ideologically motivated—determined to claim the Islamic bomb 
for his home country in Pakistan—or perhaps just a greedy businessman who happened 
into a very lucrative enterprise as a metallurgist at exactly the right time. It is evident that 
his patriotism was fueled by a desire for fame and fortune. Khan is well known for 
making a spectacle of his progress, frequently talking to the media about his efforts in 
Pakistan before his network came apart in 2004. He boasted of his success, “A country, 
which could not make sewing needles, good bicycles or even ordinary durable metalled 
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roads was embarking on one of the latest and most difficult technologies.”143 However, 
the fact that his export business supplied nuclear technologies and expertise to unlikely 
allies for enormous profit appears to demonstrate that Khan’s personal greed ultimately 
trumped his patriotism. When it came undone, his network resembled a profit-driven 
corporation rather than a nationalist state procurement program. Furthermore, the actors 
in his network were businessmen from around the world with no real stake in Pakistan’s 
procurement, aside from the high commissions they made from it. In any case, Khan’s 
personal motivations and the motivations of his “board of directors” kept him active over 
a period of decades, building an extensive global network that eventually became a 
private sector bazaar for nuclear weapons proliferation.144  
Khan’s close associates—explained in greater detail below—were purely 
financially motivated. Gerhard Wisser, for instance, is described by his former colleagues 
to have enjoyed the “money and adrenaline” of his dealings in covert uranium 
enrichment, first for South Africa and then for Khan’s network.145 The Tinners—
profitable engineers turned moles—are believed to have received as much as $10 million 
for the information they provided to Western intelligence on Khan’s activities.146 
Without this propensity for profit, Khan could not have built his business. The possibility 
of enormous wealth made it worth it for network members to engage in risky behavior, 
particularly since, historically, the consequences were light penalties, at worst.147  
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3. Organizational Structure 
a. Star Turned Corporation 
The Khan procurement network resembled what network analysts now 
describe as a star structure, with A.Q. Khan as the central node. The other nodes were a 
variety of businesses, front companies, government officials, and individuals who 
helped—wittingly or unwittingly—procure and transfer sensitive materials and 
technologies for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. This increasingly elaborate web of 
interconnected nodes made it possible for Khan and his associates to eventually transfer 
everything they had acquired for the Pakistani program—nuclear weapons designs, 
materials and technology—around the world by identifying false end users and cleverly 
manipulating import/export laws.  
 
 
Figure 3.   Structure of the A.Q. Khan Procurement Network148 
Khan’s export network was a business, even if not legally incorporated as 
one. It operated more like a corporation than a state. Rather than using KRL as a base of 
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operations for his exporting business, Dubai acted as the main office; with its Jebel Ali 
Free Trade Zone, Dubai was an ideal place to do business. Khan functioned as the chief 
executive officer and relied heavily on his inner circle—a group of trusted contacts he 
assembled throughout his years in the business—as a “board of directors” of sorts, each 
with his own area of expertise. These were the same contacts Khan made during his time 
in Europe who helped him establish a uranium enrichment program for Pakistan. Sri 
Lankan businessman Mohamed Farooq, a close associate of Khan’s, acted as the 
network’s chief operating officer—a role his “nephew,” Seyed Abu Tahir Bin Bukhary 
(B.S.A. Tahir, also known as “Junior”) eventually filled. Farooq worked out of Bin 
Belailah Enterprises (BBE) in Dubai, which was used to receive consignments of nuclear 
equipment designed for Pakistan’s centrifuge program.149 B.S.A. Tahir began working at 
BBE in 1982. Tasked at first with mundane jobs, such as getting tea for participants, he 
gradually worked his way up and took over Khan’s Dubai operations in the 1990s.150 He 
has since been referred to as the Khan network’s “chief financial officer and money 
launderer.”151  
Khan’s “board of directors” included the following key individuals: Henk 
Slebos, Gotthard Lerch, Heinz Mebus, Gerhard Wisser, Daniel Geiges, Abdus Salam, 
Peter Griffin, Ernest Piffl, Friedrich, Urs and Marcos Tinner, and Günes Cire. Dutchman 
and metallurgist Henk Slebos first met Khan at Delf Technical University in 1963, and 
later worked with him at UCN in the early 1970s. Slebos considers himself to be Khan’s 
“best friend,” and was a key supplier of the Khan network.152 German businessman, 
Gotthard Lerch, was equally if not more critical; without his influence as a senior 
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salesman at Leybold-Heraeus—a world leader in vacuum technology and, formerly, one 
of the most egregious export control violators—Khan would almost certainly not have 
been successful.153 Lerch was also a long-time colleague of Farooq and Tahir.154 Heinz 
Mebus, another old university friend of Khan’s, ran an engineering bureau in Germany 
and became a middleman for Khan’s centrifuge effort in the 1970s.155 With his boss, 
Mebus supplied a complete plant to make uranium hexafluoride at Dera Ghazi Khan in 
Pakistan in the late 1970s.156 British Muslim, Abdus Salam, was an old friend of Khan’s, 
and one of his first recruits. He helped set up trading companies and acted as a third-party 
hub from which Khan could recruit specialists for his program.157 Salam did business 
with British engineer, Peter Griffin, who was later based at Gulf Technical Industries 
(GTI) in Dubai. Griffin first met Khan in 1980, and eventually supplied workshop 
machines for Libya to produce centrifuge components, known as the “Machine Shop.”158 
Ernest Piffl was a German company official at Team Industries, which supplied 
centrifuge frequency converters.159 Initially recruited by Slebos, Günes Cire was a steady 
supplier of frequency converters from Turkey until he was arrested in 2004.160  
Lerch subcontracted German engineer, Gerhard Wisser, for the Libya 
deal.161 Lerch ordered Wisser to purchase equipment directly from Leybold from his base 
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in South Africa.162 Swiss national, Daniel Geiges, joined Wisser at Krisch Engineering—
a major supplier to South Africa’s nuclear program—in 1978.163 He was also connected 
to Lerch from the early 1970s, when he obtained Leybold-Heraeus equipment for South 
Africa’s uranium enrichment program.164 Swiss engineer, Freidrich Tinner—and later his 
sons Urs and Marco Tinner—produced centrifuge components out of the UAE, Turkey 
and Malaysia.165 The Tinners were close business associates with Günes Cire in Istanbul. 
Unfortunately for Khan, they are widely believed to have been the moles that provided 
information to the CIA and MI6 that ultimately let to the network’s unraveling.166 For 
several decades, the combined expertise and resources of this “board of directors,” along 
with their mutual greed for profit, made the procurement and proliferation networks 
possible. Their close personal relationships also ensured a high-level of trust that 
bolstered their business relationships, making it easier to engage in risky behavior 
without fear of being turned in by an associate.  
4. Sources and Patterns of Funding 
A.Q. Khan financed his network in a number of ways, and used similar tactics for 
his procurement and proliferation activities. Initially, Pakistan relied on direct assistance 
from Muslim nations, most notably Libya and Saudi Arabia, who were supportive of its 
efforts to procure the first “Islamic bomb.” He was able to pay above-market prices 
without scrutiny, both because it was viewed as a justifiable expense for a nuclear 
weapons program, and, at times, because those who may otherwise have stopped him 
received kickbacks from the exchange. In 1999, Khan admitted to having purchased key 
items through front companies in Japan and Singapore at a 15 to 25 percent markup. He 
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sometimes ordered more than what was necessary of a particular item, which he would 
then sell at a profit. When Pakistan updated its technology from the P-1 to the P-2 
centrifuge, Khan sold the older, used technology. The biggest difference between the 
financing of Khan’s procurement network and his proliferation enterprise was that Khan 
had Pakistan’s direct support in his efforts to establish an indigenous uranium enrichment 
program. He most likely enjoyed tacit support for his proliferation activities in the sense 
that the state did not stop him, but this relationship is less clear. 
a. Manipulation of the “Gray” Market and Export Controls 
Khan made use of secret banking systems and front companies to move 
money and hide the true intent of the transactions. He established offshore agents and 
purchasing companies, through which he funneled parts and capital. He utilized 
clandestine funding methods, making payments in letters of credit, bank transfers, and 
money laundering through companies or unscrupulous financial institutions like the Bank 
of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI). Banks funded the shipment and 
transshipment of sensitive items through Dubai, Europe, Singapore and Hong Kong using 
false end-user certificates that concealed their final destination. He used multiple 
intermediaries to transship and re-export items to Pakistan from the UAE, Turkey, South 
Africa and Malaysia, among others. He protected his transactions by using multiple 
agents or front companies to purchase the same product, just in case. He hid dual-use 
items among long lists of useless material when listing shipment components to comply 
with export controls, rightly thinking that this “needle in a haystack” approach would not 
draw attention to the item.167  He purchased individual components rather than whole 
units. Where Pakistan was blocked from buying parts, it began to manufacture its own. 
His employees reverse-engineered products from other countries to develop indigenous 
production capability. He bought into established manufacturing companies and recruited 
technical experts through bribery and/or deception.  
Khan always stayed one step ahead of export controls. It is difficult to 
plug holes quickly in the existing export framework—particularly so when commercial 
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interests supersede the nonproliferation agenda. In a profit-driven market, there is 
incentive to utilize free-trade zones, which are essentially able to circumvent most 
export-control regulations.168 The UAE, for instance, did not have an export control law 
until 2007. Many of the goods intended for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program (as with 
Libya and Iran) went through Dubai. Malaysia, which was critical in providing parts for 
Libya’s covert nuclear weapons program, did not have export control laws until April 
2010, and was not a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Germany, which 
was the main supplier of components to Pakistan, had more lenient export controls on 
dual-use commodities because it was not a nuclear power. South Africa, which had just 
dismantled its nuclear weapons program, was no longer considered a threat to global 
proliferation, although it maintained an extensive nuclear infrastructure. It was just the 
unsuspecting partner that Khan needed to conduct his business.  Switzerland’s Chur 
Valley was also known as “Vacuum Valley” for its centrifuge equipment production. 
Custom-made gas and solidification units, which convert solid uranium hexafluoride 
(UF6) into a gas to feed the centrifuge and then back into a solid after enrichment, were 
not even on the “trigger” list of banned nuclear-sensitive items,169 nor were the vacuum 
tubes or valves that were used in centrifuges and sold by Vakuum Apparat Technik 
(VAT), of which Freidrich Tinner was the export manager.170  
Because of the holes in international export controls, Khan’s regional 
partners prided themselves in the presumed lawfulness of their transactions. Peter Griffin 
boasted that his shipments “conformed to whatever export controls were in place at the 
time.”171 It is estimated that approximately two thirds of Griffin’s business was 
“legitimate” in the sense that it did not break a law.172 A U.S. General Accounting Office 
report stated that between 1988 and 1992, over 80 percent (650 of 808) of export 
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applications for nuclear-related equipment to Pakistan were approved.173 Stern, a German 
magazine, reported that about 70  German firms conducted nuclear-related business with 
Pakistani-associated enterprises throughout the 1980s.174 CORA Engineering in 
Switzerland was able to fill a large supply order for a customized gas and solidification 
plant, which it delivered on three specially chartered C-130 planes to Pakistan.175 
Members of the Khan network brought together components that were designed in one 
country, manufactured in a second, shipped through a third, assembled in a fourth, and 
put to use in a fifth. In doing so, they skillfully avoided detection for many years. 
Starting in 1996, Dutch export control authorities tried to undermine 
Slebos’ export business with a so-called “catch-all” clause, which allowed them to 
impose ad hoc export licenses to unregulated dual-use commodities that were suspected 
of being destined for WMD-related programs.176 In the absence of clear regulations, the 
catch-all clause enabled the Dutch government to legally prevent Slebos from exporting 
anything that had a potential military purpose. Of the catch-alls invoked by the Dutch 
government between 1996 and 2004, approximately two-thirds can be attributed to 
Slebos. Slebos was able to get around this by creating new business channels abroad, 
which made Dutch intervention difficult.177 Ultimately, he was never convicted, and 
continued to supply the Khan network until its unraveling in 2004. Similarly, Friedrich 
Tinner was able to avoid conviction. In 1996, Swiss authorities questioned Tinner about a 
shipment of specialized valves the IAEA discovered in Jordan on its way to Iraq before 
the Gulf War. Tinner claimed to have no idea how the valves arrived in Jordan, and said 
that they had been shipped legally to Singapore. In his words, it was not his responsibility 
where they had gone after that.178 The Swiss statute of limitations on export violations 
had, at that point, expired, so authorities did not press the matter with Tinner.  
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b. Bank of Credit and Commerce International  
Pakistani businessman Agha Hasan Abedi established BCCI in 1972 as the 
first multinational bank of the Third World. Financed by capital from members of the 
ruling families of various Gulf states (the UAE in particular), BCCI had criminal leanings 
from the beginning. For decades, it successfully evaded government regulation and 
control through the use of shell organizations, kickbacks, bribes and bank confidentiality 
in places like Luxembourg and the Cayman Islands. When journalists or other witnesses 
threatened its exposure, it intimidated them out of sharing information.179 It had upwards 
of 400 offices in over 78 countries, and benefitted from the support of well-placed 
individuals such as former Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford, who lobbied on its 
behalf. According to the 1992 report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by 
Senators John Kerry and Hank Brown, BCCI was involved in billions of dollars in fraud; 
money laundering; bribing officials on nearly every continent; support of terrorism, arms 
trafficking, and the sale of nuclear technologies; prostitution; income tax evasion; 
smuggling; illegal immigration; illicit purchases of banks and real estate; and “a panoply 
of financial crimes limited only by the imagination of its officers and customers.”180  
The extent of BCCI’s involvement in financing Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapons program is still not well understood, and is the first item listed under the Kerry 
report’s “Matters for Further Investigation.”181 Pakistan is believed to have received 
funding for its nuclear program through the BCCI Foundation in Pakistan and through 
BCCI-Canada, as in case of Archie Pervez, a Pakistani-born Canadian businessman. 
Additionally, several Gulf states—most notably Saudi Arabia—are suspected of passing 
secret financial assistance through BCCI. The BCCI Foundation was a means through 
which the Pakistan government was able to shelter profits from taxation. Pakistan’s 
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former Minister of Finance, Ishaq Khan, granted the Foundation tax-free status in 1981 in 
exchange for its pledge to use profits from Pakistani operations to finance projects the 
government could not pay for itself. In the late 1980s, it “donated” over $10 million in 
grants for a private science and technology institute led by A.Q. Khan. Bank officials also 
purchased nuclear technologies on behalf of the government, paid for by Pakistani front 
companies through BCCI-Canada.182 BCCI-Canada was instrumental in financing the 
now infamous purchase by Arshad “Archie” Pervez of a highly specialized maraging 
steel used in the nuclear industry at gas centrifuge plants. Destined for the P-2, it was an 
upgrade to the aluminum rotors used in Pakistan’s P-1 design that were prone to 
shattering.183 At the time, it only was made by seven companies in the United States.184 
The relationship between BCCI and the Pakistan government is somewhat 
better understood. Abedi befriended President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto after Pakistan’s civil 
war, to whom he made payoffs during the elections.185 Abedi later showed allegiance to 
General Zia ul Haq after the 1978 coup that installed him, even though Zia had Bhutto 
executed for financial crimes in which Abedi was involved.186 Despite this apparent 
conflict of interest, Zia’s relationship with Abedi was the most helpful for BCCI. He 
helped Abedi usher important Arab visitors and bank clients through (or around) 
immigration and customs requirements in Pakistan, while BCCI helped Zia evade 
international monetary controls.187 Zia’s sudden death in a 1988 plane crash was a blow  
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to Abedi’s relationship with the Pakistan government, although he found an immediate 
friend in Ishaq Khan—Zia’s successor—who had served as chairman of the BCCI 
Foundation through the 1980s.188  
c. B.S.A. Tahir and the Libya Deal 
Particularly after BCCI was shut down in 1991, Khan relied heavily on the 
financial expertise of B.S.A. Tahir, who was heavily involved in Khan’s last and most 
daring transaction: the Libya deal. He recalled in his 2006 deposition of its financing:  
In some cases the Libyans made payments directly to the contractors. The 
contractors had opened bank accounts in various names. I recall E-Projects 
and JOVITE as being two of the accounts. I requested two of my friends, 
namely, Syed Fareed Al Habshi and Shah Hakim to allow the Libyans to 
deposit money into their off-shore accounts and to then transfer the money 
into the contractors, accounts.189  
According to Tahir, Syed Fareed Al Habshi operated the following 
companies: Aisha Investments and Al-Hayat Investments in Malaysia, Perfect 
International and City Investment Off-Shore in Hong Kong, and Oryx Trading in Dubai. 
Shah Hakim operated Shorthill Capital in Malaysia, Shahzenin in Singapore, and Zen 
Resources. The Libyans also made use of banks in London. Tahir attested to having been 
shown Credit Suisse bank deposits, which show payments into the account by Hussain 
Mohammed Musaddi, Al Hayat Investment LTD, City Investment Offshore LTD, 
Shorthill Capital Limited, and National for Industrial Safety Libya.190  
5. Network Overlap 
Khan had significant advantages from his relationship with Pakistan, which 
wanted a nuclear bomb at any cost. But he was also a shrewd businessman who knew 
how to manipulate the system to get what he wanted. Perhaps most significant was his 
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ability to make extensive use of his personal connections, which were the basis of his 
network. These techniques enabled the network’s success and longevity, and we can 
expect other networks to replicate them in future nuclear procurement pursuits.  
a. How Pakistan Enabled A. Q. Khan  
Pakistan’s effort to build a nuclear weapons program involved competition 
between two separate entities that were tasked with the same objective: obtain technology 
and materials for a nuclear weapons program. The Khan Research Laboratory (KRL), 
named after A. Q. Khan when he became its leader, was able to operate with near 
impunity, although the extent to which the Pakistan government was aware of Khan’s 
activities and expenditures is subject to debate. Government authorities provided him 
with a remarkable degree of authority and autonomy from the outset—partly because he 
demanded it, and partly because of the incredibly sensitive nature of his work. Initially, 
Bhutto personally handled the nuclear weapons program, which meant that Khan 
operated largely outside of the government’s bureaucracy. Zia further compartmentalized 
Khan’s nuclear activities, affording him more autonomy. The Pakistan military provided 
security at the Kahuta nuclear site, which involved protecting facilities and scientists 
from external threats more than checking up on Khan’s activities.191 Pakistan’s Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI) was kept largely out of procurement, although it apparently 
began reporting around 1988–89 that KRL was conducting activities outside of the scope 
of Pakistan’s nuclear program.192 Because of the urgent demand to develop a deterrent to 
neighboring India, Pakistan was more concerned with the results of the KRL’s 
procurement than the possibility, or rather likelihood, of nefarious activity. So long as he 
delivered results, Khan was left alone.  
The resources, support, authority and autonomy that Khan received from 
Pakistan were critical to his network operation. They provided him advantages that 
enabled him to be successful, not only in his procurement for Pakistan, but later in his 
export business. Because Pakistan had a get-it-at-any-cost mentality, he was able to pay 
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above market premium for products—often up to 50 percent higher than market price—
which made doing business with him lucrative for potential suppliers. Also with the 
support of the government, Khan was able to utilize Pakistan’s embassies abroad—
particularly in Europe—using their diplomatic pouches to send material home.193 When 
Pakistan transferred from the earlier P-1 centrifuge model to the P-2 for uranium 
enrichment, Khan was able to sell unwanted P-1 parts to Libya and others. He took that 
one step further and often purposefully ordered extra parts for Pakistan’s program—
sometimes double the required amount—which he later exported for his own profit. Khan 
also had the advantage of support from Pakistani-born foreign nationals who, either 
motivated by financial or ideological reasons, helped collect information and procure 
spare parts. 
b. Overlap With Other Proliferation Networks 
Khan’s overlap with other proliferation networks was the basis for his 
export business. He specifically targeted states whose desire for nuclear technology and 
expertise aligned with Khan’s desire for profit. Iran, North Korea and Libya all had a 
demand for his product, and they were willing to pay. Khan began his dealings with Iran 
as early as 1987, when three Iranian officials reportedly met with members of the Khan 
network in Dubai (Mebus, Mohammed Farouq and B.S.A. Tahir). At this meeting, they 
offered Iran the following things: a disassembled sample machine (including 
specifications, drawings and descriptions); specifications, drawings and calculations for a 
complete plant of 2,000 machines; auxiliary vacuum and electric equipment; and uranium 
reconversion and casting capabilities.194 Phase I lasted from 1987–1992, during which 
time Khan approached Iran with a so-called “shopping list” of P-1 centrifuge designs. 
Iran did not buy everything on Khan’s list, preferring instead to use it as a ‘buyer’s guide’ 
while procuring some of the items on its own.195 Because the P-1 centrifuges had  
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previously been used in Pakistan’s own program, they had traces of HEU particles, which 
proved false Iran’s statement to the IAEA that it had produced the centrifuges 
domestically.196  
Phase II of the Iran deal lasted from 1994–1999, and involved duplicate P-
1 centrifuge designs, components for 500 P-1 centrifuges, P-2 centrifuge designs, and 
technical consulting. Iran has admitted to meeting with network intermediaries 13 times 
between 1994 and 1999.197 It is still unknown whether Khan transferred nuclear bomb 
designs to Iran, and why there was a gap in 1994–5 between the P-2 design and Iran’s 
reported start of work in 2002. In spite of the fact that the old P-1 centrifuges were, in 
many cases, faulty and damaged, the samples and accompanying detailed specifications 
and drawings allowed Iran to skip ahead in its research and make thousands of 
centrifuges on its own, ordering parts individually from the Khan network.198  
Missile cooperation with North Korea took place from 1993 to 2001. 
North Korea was known for its ballistic missile production, which Pakistan needed to 
match India’s Agni and Prithvi ballistic missile programs. Its medium-range No-dong 
missile appeared perfect for Pakistan’s requirements, and Pakistan reportedly struck a 
deal for 15–25 No-dong missiles and at least one launcher—most of which were 
delivered by the spring of 1996.199 North Korea had already sold missiles to Iran, Egypt, 
Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen by the time Khan approached it. North Korea had certain 
conventional weapons, like artillery and anti-aircraft guns that Pakistan armed forces 
needed, and had a reputation for exporting military supplies at a low rate because it 
needed the money.200  These factors made the Pakistan-DPRK relationship an alliance for 
mutual benefit. North Korea was pursuing the plutonium route to nuclear weapons, 
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whereas Pakistan was rapidly advancing through the uranium enrichment route. The 
DPRK was interested in HEU, and therefore A.Q. Khan was able to provide North Korea 
with approximately twelve old centrifuges, drawings, sketches and technical data, 
depleted UF6, and a shopping list of what it could buy. It was much easier for Khan to 
ship nuclear components to North Korea than to Iran because trade in sensitive military 
equipment with Pyongyang had already been authorized.201 
Taking place between 1997 and 2003, the Libya deal was by far the 
riskiest, most important venture of Khan’s career. It involved large-scale collaboration 
with individuals and companies all around the world. The Libya deal differed from the 
Iran and North Korea deals in three main ways: First, it took place after Khan was 
removed from KRL. Second, it was the first time the network managed to produce the 
entire array of materials, tools and technologies required to fabricate gas centrifuges for 
uranium enrichment in a single country outside of Pakistan. Third, it differed in scale 
because—while Iran and North Korea already had a fair degree of technology and 
expertise—with Libya, Khan had to start from scratch.202 Libya contracted A.Q. Khan to 
manufacture centrifuge components and assemble them offsite, after which they were 
installed and operated at a location outside of Tripoli. Khan suggested that the Libyans 
build sheds for the centrifuges that look like goat or camel farms in order to camouflage 
them. The offsite construction maximized profits for Khan and his associates, and kept 
the Libyan program dependent on them for advice in the long-term.203  
The Libya deal involved 20 complete L-1 centrifuges, and components for 
an additional 200; two sample L-1 centrifuges; UF6 (which is speculated to have come 
from North Korea); a machine shop to produce and repair centrifuges and train Libyan 
technicians; and nuclear bomb designs and instructions. GTI in Dubai placed the orders 
for dual-use machinery, which Scomi Precision Engineering (SCOPE) in Malaysia was 
established to machine. SCOPE then shipped relabeled equipment via various ships and 
ports to GTI in Dubai, from where they were transshipped and bound for Libya. Libya 
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ultimately ordered components for 10,000 L-2 centrifuges and a UF6 piping system, 
which was manufactured but not delivered. The centrifuge equipment included ring 
magnets, aluminum and maraging steel, flow forming and balancing equipment, vacuum 
pumps, non-corrosive pipes and valves, end caps and baffles and power supply inverters. 
Supplying 10,000 centrifuges—each of which has 96 parts—meant that the supplier 
would have to procure or manufacture over a million components and ship them all to 
Libya—an enormous and dangerous task.204 To meet this challenge, Khan’s network 
increased the capacity of existing front companies and established factories in non-
traditional supplier companies to procure, assemble, and manufacture the components for 
the enrichment process.205 
Khan also overlapped with states that had established nuclear weapons 
programs in support of Pakistan’s nuclear procurement, and China in particular. China 
and Pakistan had a mutual interest in keeping nuclear-armed neighbor India at bay, and 
commended “peaceful” nuclear cooperation in 1976. China provided essential expertise, 
support and technical assistance for Pakistan’s efforts early on, and is sometimes referred 
to as the “silent partner” in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.206 While the 
relationship between China and Pakistan was officially state-to-state, according to 
Richard Barlow, a CIA counterproliferation expert involved in uncovering the network, 
“Khan was the guy with the contacts.” He allegedly made many visits to China during the 
1980s, including two trips for training in weapons design.207 Khan exploited his expertise 
and the weakness in China’s own nuclear weapons program, creating an alliance for 
mutual benefit. China had a relatively weak centrifuge enrichment program in which 
Khan was able to assist with the designs and technology from his time at URENCO. 
China assisted Khan with its reactors and gave him enough nuclear material to test his 
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designs at early stages.208 China reportedly provided Pakistan with blueprints for 
building a nuclear weapon—most likely the Chic-4, which was first tested as a missile 
warhead in 1966.209 In 1981, Khan sent his agents detailed drawings of weapons 
components based on this blueprint, ordering them to buy these components from 
European companies, including that of Henk Slebos.210 Khan would often buy equipment 
from China, and then reverse engineer it so that he could build it indigenously.211  
c. Overlap With Dissimilar Networks 
There is little evidence of overlap between the Khan network and other 
illicit networks—including drug or terrorist networks—outside of financial linkages. One 
could make the argument that BCCI operated as a “network” of sorts, and therefore the 
Khan-BCCI connection is further evidence of financial overlap. But these were alliances 
for mutual benefit. Khan was not interested in drug trafficking or terrorist activities—he 
was interested in profit and expanding his business empire.  
d. Nature of Network Overlap  
Initially, the interests of A.Q. Khan and the Pakistan government were 
aligned: obtain a nuclear weapons program for Pakistan through uranium enrichment. 
Khan was therefore given the leverage and latitude to accomplish those objectives. It was 
generally recognized among officials involved in Pakistan’s nuclear program that “all 
sorts of improvisation” were required in order to circumvent export controls and other 
nonproliferation constraints.212 The Pakistan government was willing to enlist the help of 
friendly countries like Libya, China and Saudi Arabia, for its benefit—financial, 
technical, and otherwise. After Israel attacked Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981, 
Pakistan was understandably nervous about a similar interference in its uranium 
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enrichment program. It feared the threat of an attack from Israel, the United States, or 
India, and therefore, had an even more immediate need to bolster its program in order to 
obtain a nuclear deterrent. Pakistan—and more specifically A.Q. Khan—looked outside 
of KRL and PAEC in order to procure materials and technical know-how at a faster rate, 
for instance Libya, which helped procure uranium from Niger.213 The Pakistan 
government likely made a strategic calculation to turn a blind eye to Khan’s export 
activities in spite of the fact that these outside relationships did not directly support 
Pakistan’s interests. The countries Khan targeted—Iran, North Korea and Libya—were 
all pariah states, which makes it unlikely that he was acting on behalf of the Pakistan 
government and more likely that these relationships benefitted him personally.  
A.Q. Khan and Pakistan’s relationship with China is still subject to 
speculation. As Albright writes, “China’s deal with Pakistan was so dramatic that there 
was little consensus among U.S. government officials over what ultimate agenda it 
served.”214 It may have been an effort, in part, to counter the efforts in Moscow to 
“intensify pressure on Pakistan” because of its help in sustaining the Afghan 
resistance.215 It may also have been motivated because China’s assistance with Pakistan’s 
program allowed it access to Khan’s Rolodex of European contacts and technology to 
bolster its own nuclear program. Still, China’s cooperation had its limits; it was unwilling 
to supply ready-made components related to the nuclear core, which could have been a 
factor that influenced Khan’s increased interaction with European suppliers.216 
We still do not know exactly how Khan managed to turn missile 
cooperation with North Korea into nuclear cooperation between 1997 and 2001, or how 
Khan was able to transfer nuclear bomb designs. There is also much speculation over the 
level of involvement—if any—of the Pakistan government and military in the North 
Korea deal. Pakistan had a history of missile cooperation with the DPRK, which began 
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under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the 1970s. It is unlikely that Pakistan’s armed forces were 
unaware of the acquisition of the No-dong missile system, which had serious implications 
for Pakistan’s force posture. It is also unlikely that Pakistan’s policymakers would have 
been unaware of the nuclear cooperation at the time. Still, the transfer of nuclear 
technology to North Korea would have severe consequences for Pakistan’s foreign policy 
and international reputation, making it unlikely that they stood behind Khan’s nuclear 
transfers, even if they did not directly stand in his way.217  
D. CONCLUSION  
Ultimately, it was the categorical avarice, tremendous hubris, and sheer audacity 
on which the Khan network was based that led to its demise. A.Q. Khan was a go-getter, 
a people-pleaser and a hero. He was a master at kickbacks and bribes, which kept 
scrutiny away from his activities, at least temporarily. Many of those who observed his 
malpractices were beneficiaries of the system. While successful for several decades, 
Khan and his gang made several serious missteps that could not be sustained. First and 
foremost, their greed and success deluded them into thinking they could not be caught, 
which led them to engage in risky behavior when they should have been more cautious. 
Second, they operated without regard for geopolitics, targeting pariah countries and 
failing to adjust business practices to important changes in the international system. From 
1997 to 2003, his biggest, riskiest business venture—the Libya deal—went forward as 
national and international scrutiny sharpened. It continued past the 1998 nuclear tests in 
both India and Pakistan. It continued through the creation of Pakistan’s SPD in 1999, a 
nascent command and control (C2) apparatus designed to control and provide 
accountability for its nuclear weapons program. It continued after Khan was ousted from 
his position as Chairman of KRL in March of 2001, and after the attacks on 9/11, when 
international security was tighter than ever before. It even continued beyond the 
discovery of Iran’s nuclear site at Natanz in 2002. Khan should have known that any and 
all of these events would draw attention to illicit activities. Finally, Western intelligence 
had a significant inroad into Khan’s network; the information the Tinners provided was 
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ultimately significant to help the CIA and MI6 unfold Khan’s activities and catch him at 
his own game. In 2003, spy satellites tracked the shipment of five cargo canisters full of 
specialized centrifuge parts from Scomi Precision Engineering in Malaysia through 
Dubai, where they were transferred to the German-owned BBC China that was bound for 
Libya.218 
There is no clear winner in this case. President George W. Bush called the 
unraveling of the Khan network an intelligence coup—particularly important for the 
United States in light of harsh criticism over failed intelligence leading up to the 2003 
invasion of Iraq. While Libya dismantled its nuclear program in 2003, North Korea now 
has nuclear weapons, and Iran may not be far behind. Furthermore, North Korea is 
believed to be pursuing the uranium enrichment route to nuclear weapons in addition to 
the plutonium route. It is alleged to have its own export enterprise, selling nuclear 
technology and expertise to countries like Syria and Myanmar for a profit—much like 
Khan.  
Under U.S. pressure, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf had A.Q. Khan 
arrested, but he lived comfortably under house arrest, shielded from interrogation by the 
United States and other interested countries. Still hailed by many as a hero in Pakistan, he 
was released from house arrest by current President Asif Ali Zardari in February 2009, in 
spite of his 2004 confession to running an illicit nuclear network.219 The Tinners have 
also been relatively protected, particularly because of the information they provided to 
the CIA. In May of 2008, President Pascal Couchepin of Switzerland acknowledged that 
the Swiss government had destroyed a large trove of computer files and other material 
documenting the business dealings of the Tinners and their smuggling activities with 
Libya and Iran.220 Urs Tinner was freed from jail on December 22, 2008.221 His brother 
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Marco remains incarcerated over fear that he had access to nuclear weapons secrets. In 
June 2008, Malaysia released B.S.A. Tahir from prison, saying that he was no longer a 
national security threat.222 Gerhard Wisser pled guilty to participating in Khan’s network 
in September 2007 and agreed to cooperate fully with the investigation.223 Even though 
the Dutch government was suspicious of Henk Slebos’ activities, he was able to avoid 
conviction and, miraculously, continue supplying the Khan network until its unraveling 
in 2004.  
Tighter export controls on dual-use commodities, both nationally and 
internationally, are essential to stopping the proliferation of WMD. This can be 
approached at multiple levels, from the nation state to regional forums like ASEAN to the 
United Nations. The spread of nuclear materials and technology is not solely a problem in 
states with established nuclear infrastructure; any state is capable of producing and 
exporting items with both civilian and military applications, and therefore every state 
should be concerned with where those items end up after they leave their borders. 
Additionally, harsher penalties for export control violators would make an example out of 
certain individuals and potentially deter follow-on behavior. There will always be a 
demand for nuclear weapons among some states and non-state actors, but it should be the 
responsibility of the international community to make the acquisition of a nuclear 
weapons program as difficult and risky as possible. A global nuclear fuel bank is a good 
start, which would allow non-nuclear states access to nuclear fuel for their home energy 
programs without developing a latent nuclear weapons capability. States like Iran that 
invoke their sovereign right under the NPT to build an indigenous civil nuclear capacity 
will likely choose to forgo participation in an international fuel bank, but it is a start.  
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IV. NARCOTICS NETWORKS: THE MEDELLÍN ‘CARTEL’ 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. Why Narcotics Networks Are Important 
Four decades after President Nixon declared a “war on drugs,” drug use and 
trafficking are some of the most significant and dangerous challenges we face today.  
Narcotics are by far the most highly trafficked and widespread illicit substances on the 
market. Revenues from global drug trafficking are estimated at over $400 billion per 
year.224 The networks involved in their production, transfer and distribution are often 
violent and territorial, functioning more like gangs than pure trafficking networks. They 
terrorize the local population using kidnapping, extortion and murder to achieve their 
objectives. Their bloody tactics continue to make regular headlines. In May 2010, 55 
bodies were discovered in an abandoned mine just south of Mexico City. In July, 51 
corpses were found near a trash dump outside of Monterrey. In August, Mexican marines 
discovered an unprecedented 72 bodies in San Fernando, Mexico—just 100 miles south 
of Texas.225 Over 30,000 people have been killed in drug-gang violence in Mexico alone, 
since the turf battle began between the Mexican Zetas and Gulf ‘cartels’ four years ago. 
The Latin America drug trade became a major challenge facing the United States 
beginning in the late twentieth century. Fueled by increasing demand from North 
America, the cocaine industry first boomed in the 1970s, and became even more 
problematic during the 1980s, when Colombia’s dominant Medellín cartel increased 
production to meet demand.226 Coca, marijuana, and opium poppies227 are three major 
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components of the illicit narcotics industry, primarily located in the Andean nations of 
Colombia, Peru and Bolivia.228 Cocaine, which is produced from the coca plant, is by far 
the biggest part of the Andean drug industry. Colombia produces 80 percent of the 
world’s cocaine and 90 percent of the cocaine consumed in the United States. It is also 
the Western Hemisphere’s largest producer of heroin, supplying 50 percent of the heroin 
consumed in the United States.229 The power associated with the cocaine trade has spread 
methodically to other Andean states and beyond—Chile, Ecuador, Venezuela, Panama, 
Guatemala, and alarmingly, Mexico. To highlight the volatility of this industry, narcotics 
analysts estimated that the value of Latin America’s cocaine trade was between $80 and 
$150 billion as far back as 1986.230 The ability for narcotics trafficking syndicates to 
penetrate state institutions (i.e., Panama, Colombia) and outsource violent activities to 
established terrorist organizations remains a serious threat to regional stability throughout 
South and Central America, and poses an increasingly serious risk for the U.S.-Mexico 
frontier.231  
It is difficult to overemphasize the extent to which the drug trade is deeply 
entrenched in the global and local economies. Narcotics networks are market-driven, and 
therefore, will exist as long as there is demand. Thanks, in large part, to the thriving 
demand economies of the West, there will always be a supply network with lucrative 
profit opportunities. The United States is by far the largest consumer of illicit substances 
globally, although drug distribution knows no geographical boundaries. China, Canada, 
Brazil, and the United Kingdom are just a few of the other nations actively battling the 
rise of drug use within their borders. Economic involvement in the narcotics industry is 
also problematic, which former federal agent Robert Mazur highlights in his recent New 
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York Times op-ed on international “dirty money” laundering.232 In recent years, 
American Express Bank International, Credit Suisse Group, Union Bank of California, 
BankAtlantic and Wachovia have all been involved—and caught—moving large sums of 
drug money.233 Mazur writes, “Wachovia alone moved more than $400 billion for 
account holders to Mexico, $14 billion of which was bulk currency and had been driven 
in armored cars or flown to the United States.”234 Bankers often escape prosecution 
because law enforcement fails to expose evidence of their involvement in money 
laundering. These cases frequently end in deals rather than prosecution.235 And as 
entrenched as the drug trade is in local and international economies, so too is it 
entrenched in local and international government. Narcotics and narcotics-related 
corruption continue to be endemic problems in Mexico, South America and Afghanistan, 
among other places, and are significant barriers to political and economic progress.236 
2. Why the Medellín Cartel Was Chosen as a Case Study 
In this chapter, I focus on the Medellín ‘cartel’—an extraordinary example of 
illicit entrepreneurialism that blurs the lines between political and criminal activities. 
Based out of Colombia’s second largest city, the Medellín cartel dominated the 
Colombian cocaine industry during the 1980s, creating new practices to meet growing 
demand that other drug trafficking networks employ today. This organization not only 
defined international perception of what a Colombian drug cartel looked like in the 
1980s, but is an excellent example of how a drug trafficking network interacts with 
government, the economy, and insurgent/terrorist groups. The Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC)—a Marxist-Leninist guerilla revolutionary movement in 
Colombia, for instance, is known to employ terrorism as a tactic. Since Pablo Escobar 
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was shot and killed by U.S. Special Operations Forces—or, officially, the Colombian 
National Police—in December 1993, information about the Medellín cartel has become 
more widely available. There is a variety of open source material on its motivations, 
structure, funding and affiliations. This historical case study bears important lessons that 
can be applied to the ongoing analysis of drug gangs and trafficking networks in 
Colombia, Mexico and Afghanistan today. 
3. Roadmap 
In this chapter, I begin with a brief explanation of the narcotics network typology. 
I examine the prevailing literature on narcotics trafficking to draw conclusions about 
narcotics networks in general. The rest of this chapter will focus on the Medellín cartel as 
a case study. As in the previous two chapters, I examine this case study’s motivations, 
structure, sources and patterns of funding, overlap with other narcotics networks, overlap 
with different types of terrorist and criminal activity, and in each case what the nature of 
that interaction was. I conclude with recommendations for how this information can 
inform ongoing counternarcotics activity.  
B. NARCOTICS NETWORK TYPOLOGY 
The predominant conception of what constitutes a drug network—and especially a 
cocaine trafficking network—is a large, hierarchical, vertically integrated cartel that 
dominates the market.237 Traditionally, a ‘cartel’ is a group of independent producers 
who agree to maintain cocaine wholesale prices.238 Today, the definition of a cartel has 
evolved. Experts often prefer the term drug trafficking organization, or even drug 
gangs—particularly in reference to Mexico. Howard Campbell expands on this 
controversy in Drug War Zones, in which he argues that the excessive use of the word 
‘cartel’ may sustain a number of incorrect assumptions about drug-trafficking 
organizations. For instance:  
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That they are all enormous, unified, permanent, and tightly organized from 
top to bottom; they are isomorphic… such that each region, route, or drug 
market has one and only one cartel… they are absolutely vertical in 
structure; they are removed from the larger society and strictly separate 
from the other equally seamless, coherent cartels that are their rivals.239  
Because of this traditional view of a cartel, U.S. and international 
counternarcotics efforts have typically been targeted against drug “kingpins,” which has 
had a very limited impact on the flow of drugs to the United States.240 In drug trafficking 
networks, these so-called “kingpins,” are just the tip of the iceberg. Some of the most 
important members can be lower-level individuals who are involved in transportation, 
communications, or security. This suggests that a decapitation strategy is not nearly as 
effective as a network-based strategy. 
Today, drug trafficking organizations are increasingly dispersed. Their patterns of 
interactions resemble an interconnected network—or networks—rather than a collection 
of monolithic ‘cartels’ that dominate production and set prices. Transnational crime 
expert, Phil Williams, writes that there is a tendency in law enforcement and academia 
“to treat centralized hierarchies as synonymous with organized crime and to treat 
networks as disorganized crime.”241 This, of course, is a mistake. A network is not 
disorganized, but rather a complex compilation of actors with multiple layers of 
interaction and varying degrees of involvement. Different groups, or sub-networks, 
perform specific tasks and are connected by brokers. This allows the coca producers in 
Peru to communicate with the refiners and distributors in Colombia, who will export the 
cocaine that will eventually enter the United States through Mexico—most likely after 
several detours along the way. It is within these sub-networks that we often see a 
common geographic, ethnic or familial identity. Individuals are also connected and 
recruited by friendship or professional ties. The loosely organized network form allows 
participants to compartmentalize and specialize activities, and enables decentralized 
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decision-making authority.242 Decentralized decision-making reduces the importance of 
“nonredundant nodes,”243 thereby mitigating the risk of vulnerability to what Ronald 
Burt calls “structural holes.” Structural holes, when targeted, are difficult to replace.244  
Networks are conducive to clandestine activity and cross-border transactions. 
They are flexible and adaptable in a way that a centralized hierarchy is not. Campbell 
suggests that cartels be should viewed today as “shifting, contingent, temporal alliances 
of traffickers whose territories and memberships evolve and change because of conflicts, 
imprisonment, deaths, changing political circumstances, etc., and whose fortunes and 
strengths wax and wane or die out overtime.”245 In Michael Kenny’s words, “narcos 
learn,” which means they are able to build skills and alter practices simply and 
effectively—and often faster than the organizations that target them.246 The fall of the 
Medellín cartel in Colombia in the 1990s, for instance, gave rise to its competitor, the 
Cali cartel, which essentially plugged the gap in the market after the death of Pablo 
Escobar. Where roadblocks occur, narcotics networks develop increasingly innovative 
ways to get around them, and thus the dance between traffickers and law enforcement 
continues. 
There are certain network features and structures that are more germane to the 
drug trade than others. Michael Kenny identifies two main Colombian trafficking 
network structures in From Pablo to Osama: wheel networks (also called hub-and-spoke, 
or star networks) and chain networks.247 The wheel networks contain a core and a 
periphery, which emerges from the core in the shape of a star. A drug network of any 
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substantial size will take on this form.248 The “core” generally consists of a dense 
network of individuals or small organizations that are the “steering mechanism” behind 
the network. These core members will have “bonding mechanisms” that enable a high 
degree of trust and cohesion, for instance through common ethnicity, friendship, tribal 
connections, family, or experience.249 The “periphery” is likely to be less dense, marked 
by looser relationships in which the bonding mechanism is not quite as strong.250 This 
illustrates what Mark Granovetter terms “the strength of weak ties,” because these 
peripheral actors allow the network to operate more extensively and with greater 
impact.251 The core is much more difficult for law enforcement to target than the 
periphery, both because entry is dependent on a high level of trust, and also because there 
are nodes—called brokers, or intermediaries—that act as insulators between them.252 
Rather than forming a horizontal chain of interactions, drug trafficking organizations 
engage in open competition in a manner that looks more like an interconnected network 
than a one-way directional flow.253 They are market-oriented. The largest networks 
function and appear structurally more like a multinational corporation than what one 
might assume of a trafficking cartel.254 They are, by any account, business enterprises.  
The second main type of narcotics network structure is the chain network, which 
consists of a decentralized series of independent nodes that form specific tasks and 
interact without oversight from the core group.255 Transactions are horizontal rather than 
vertical and often coordinate their activities on an ad hoc basis. Because of their flat 
structure, chain networks are not marked by the presence of highly connected “nodes” 
that would be vulnerable to structural holes, and are therefore generally immune to 
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decapitation efforts. In addition to lacking a “core” coordinating body, chain networks 
lack mechanisms for sharing risk, which makes them more vulnerable to penetration by 
government, law enforcement or theft.256 Still, chain networks bear certain similarities to 
wheel networks—in particular, the presence of close interpersonal relationships and 
government corruption. Furthermore, these different structures of networks interact at 
various intermediary nodes, which adds to the overall complexity of the international 
drug trade.  
As mentioned above, narcotics networks are often divided along geographic, 
ethnic, and familial lines. Mexican drug gangs, for instance, have close family ties and 
are very territorial, often engaging in turf wars. Nigerians occupy a significant portion of 
the trafficking network that brings heroin from places like Afghanistan and Myanmar to 
the United States—through Chicago in particular.257 Close ethnic ties ensure trust and 
efficiency, and they allow different sectors of the drug trade to exploit their competitive 
advantage: location, language, local knowledge and the “ability to melt into the 
crowd.”258 They also facilitate recruitment and communication among networks. High-
risk transactions often rely on the “trust and mutual recognition that a common ethnic 
background implies,” although this is not always an option.259 As Moises Naím writes in 
Illicit, given the growing demand and high-value nature of their product, “a great many 
drug transactions are simply that—transactions.”260 This points back to the market 
model: while drug trafficking networks are often family-run and can function much like 
gangs or organized crime rings, they are ultimately market-driven. Violence—or the 
threat of violence—occurs where trust does not. This is the link that connects cocaine 
producers in South America to the distributors in the United States, or those that  
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reprocess opium from Afghanistan to those who transport it to Western Europe. It 
exemplifies the underlying motivation of the drug industry: profit—enforced by trust 
and/or fear. 
Drug trafficking is a form of economic activity that is integrated, interconnected, 
promoted, and often protected by various state sectors.261 Government involvement in the 
drug trade often favors one cartel over another, which allows some of the largest drug 
trafficking groups to take on a quasi-monopolistic structure.262 Campbell refers to the 
intersection between drug organizations and government institutions (law enforcement, 
political, military, etc.) as la plaza.263 The penetration of government by drug traffickers 
makes counter-network activity increasingly difficult. When an individual in government 
becomes an essential node in the trafficking network, that network often receives a 
certain degree of protection from law enforcement activities.264 The nexus between 
organized crime and government is an incredible impediment to political and economic 
progress in countries such as Afghanistan, Mexico, Colombia and Nigeria.  
The drug-insurgency nexus is often referred to as “narcoterrorism,” which Jordan 
Paust defines as the politically motivated terrorist activities (i.e., kidnapping, 
assassinations, bombings, or the threats of these activities) entangled in the drug trade. 
Once most prominent in the Andean region in South America, so-called “narcoterrorism” 
is frequently targeted against those who oppose or threaten to expose the drug trade. 
Attacks against journalists have grown increasingly prominent in Mexico in recent 
months. There are many reasons for the overlap between terrorists and transnational 
criminal organizations, and especially narcotics trafficking syndicates. For one thing, 
they share similar characteristics, and often borrow techniques and tactics from one 
another; they operate in areas with limited government control, weak law enforcement 
and open borders; they use similar communication technologies; employ money-
laundering techniques; use violence and intimidation to achieve their ends; and, of 
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course, require money to finance their activities.265 Terrorist and criminal networks 
clearly have mutual interests, in spite of their obvious differences. Most importantly, as 
Nathan Minami points out, criminal networks support terrorist networks because 
“terrorist networks undermine state security, making it easier for criminal networks to 
operate. In turn, terrorist networks back criminal organizations because criminal 
organizations generate revenue streams that terrorist networks can draw financing 
from.”266  
Rollins et al. note that there are three primary ways in which criminal groups and 
terrorists overlap: (1) through shared tactics and methods; (2) transforming from one 
group into another over time; and (3) through short-term or long-term “transaction-based 
service-for-hire activities between groups.”267 The financial, or service-for-hire, link is 
the most obvious (and would look much like a horizontal transaction in a chain link). 
Still, this relationship is not always as symbiotic as a market-oriented look would 
indicate. Vanda Felbab-Brown argues that the standard “narco-guerilla” approach focuses 
on the financial gains of this nexus at the expense of other key dynamics, including 
political legitimacy and direct military benefits—namely in the form of expanded 
strategic and tactical options and improved relations with the local populations.268 There 
is also a high degree of competition between these groups, which is sometimes 
overlooked. Still, although contentiously debated at the time, there are clear examples of 
tactical overlap between Colombian drug cartels and established regional terrorist 
networks. A primary example was yielded by the joint Colombian military and DEA raid 
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against a “cocaine super-lab” on March 10, 1984. Owned by Medellín “kingpin” Pablo 
Escobar, and located deep in the FARC-controlled Yari plains, this raid exposed deep ties 
between narcotraffickers and leftist guerillas and terrorists, namely the FARC and the M-
19 movement.269  
C. CASE STUDY: THE MEDELLÍN CARTEL  
1. Background/History 
Pablo Escobar Gaviria personified the international narcotics market during the 
1980s as the leader of the Medellín cartel in Colombia. Although coca was first 
cultivated in Colombia in pre-Spanish times by the Amerindian population, it was the 
criminal entrepreneurs from pre-Castro Cuba, like Escobar, who established market 
control of Colombia’s burgeoning coca industry and subsequently brought Colombia into 
the multi-billion dollar cocaine trade.270 The Cuban mafia thrived during the dictatorship 
of Fulgencio Batista (1952–1959) and helped import small amounts of cocaine from 
South America. Following Fidel Castro’s takeover in 1959, the Cuban mafia fled the 
island and resettled in Cuban neighborhoods in Florida. The market connections and drug 
trafficking networks remained intact, and the Cuban mafia continued to play a major role 
in the trafficking of cocaine into the United States throughout the 1960s.  
Before long, the financial benefits of the cocaine industry helped entice a new 
breed of criminal enterprise to rise up and eliminate Cuban domination on the cocaine 
industry: Colombia’s Medellín cartel. Historians usually associate 1981 with the birth of 
the Medellín cartel, but counternarcotics experts posit its origins extend back as early as 
the late 1960s, when “the Colombians began bypassing the Cuban connection, moving 
directly into almost all facets of the industry, horizontally and vertically.”271 The 
Colombians began to fight for control of both the wholesale and retail aspects of the 
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cocaine distribution industry; by the end of 1978, they successfully uprooted their Cuban 
rivals, gaining control of the wholesale distribution of cannabis inside the United 
States.272 At the height of its power, the Medellín cartel succeeded in controlling the 
distribution of an estimated 80 percent of all cocaine entering the United States, and 
established trafficking networks in Panama, Central America, Mexico, Suriname, Cuba 
and the Bahamas.273  
Medellín traffickers imported coca paste from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia, 
where it was refined it into a powder and then exported through these routes to the United 
States, among other places, where local affiliates would distribute the product. Medellín 
drug capos were involved in all aspects of the trade, from the purchase of raw materials 
to cocaine production, transportation, distribution and sale.274 What started out as a 
small-scale trafficking organization that brought cocaine shipments from Colombia to the 
United States through the use of human “mules” carrying a suitcase (often combined with 
marijuana shipments), emerged into a sophisticated large-scale international operation. 
As early as the mid-1970s, cocaine could be processed in Colombian jungle labs for 
$1,500 per kilo and then sold on the streets in the United States for $50,000 per kilo. 
Profits grew with rising demand from the West, which could then be reinvested to 
develop more sophisticated and innovative techniques to refine and export cocaine while 
avoiding detection. They began to contract with pilots to fly bulk shipments, and even 
hired engineering experts from the United States and Russia to design a submarine to 
smuggle cocaine to the United States.275 According to Luis Cañon, as of the 1980s there 
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were at least 10 organizations involved in the Medellín-based cocaine industry, each of 
which had its own pilots, cocaine packers, shipping routes and representatives abroad, 
and all of which “revolved around Escobar.”276  
2. Motivation 
Drug smugglers are conservative, profit-oriented, and motivated to preserve the 
political status quo (as it benefits their business). They are territorial, and employ 
violence as a tactic to support their objectives. The Medellín cartel was ultimately 
motivated by profit. With hundreds of billions available each year in generated revenues, 
it is easy to understand why one may be tempted to get involved.277 Pablo Escobar, Jorge 
Ochoa and José Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha all made Forbes Magazine’s July 1988 list of 
the top 125 non-U.S. billionaires.278 In his heyday, Escobar alone is believed to have 
amassed a personal fortune of $3 billion in drug profits.279 When the Colombian 
government finally began to confiscate assets, they found “at least $125 million of drug 
trafficking assets—including 1,800 buildings and country estates, 470 planes, and 600 
vehicles,” most of which belonged to the leaders of the Medellín cartel and their 
associates.280 For some, it was a living; for others, it was a fringe benefit. Those involved 
in the transportation industry, for instance, could make many times their normal salary by 
including narcotics in their regular cargo every once in a while. Similarly, bankers would 
“assist” in moving money or establishing offshore accounts if they could skim a bit off 
the top.281 With increasingly innovative techniques to avoid being caught—and, of 
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course, the ability to bribe Colombian law enforcement if they were—the risks were low 
and (for many) well worth the potential gains.  
The Medellín cartel is an interesting case study because its leadership became 
more entrenched in government than a typical narcotics organization. Unlike terrorist 
groups, drug trafficking networks do not necessarily have ideological motivations, 
although certain individuals may have personal motivations that extend beyond profit. As 
Rensselaer W. Lee III writes in The White Labyrinth, the leaders of the Colombian drug 
trade during the 1980s posed “as defenders of national values, as civic leaders, and as 
fighters for progress.” The so-called Medellín mafia had two main political objectives: 
(1) the defeat of the U.S.-Colombian extradition treaty, which allowed Colombia to send 
traffickers to the United States for trial and sentencing, and (2) the initiation of peace 
negotiations with the Colombian government.282 Some capos worked within the system, 
using bribes and financial contributions to influence political leaders and ensure 
protection from the law for their activities; others sought to change the system. Carlos 
Lehder and Pablo Escobar, for instance, both grew to be political personalities. They 
desired influence in politics, not just for the gain of their trafficking enterprise, but for 
their individual political agendas—a practice not typical in drug trafficking organizations, 
and one that ultimately backfired.  
3. Organizational Structure 
The Colombian cocaine industry of the 1980s was more hierarchical than it is 
today, but it still resembled a dispersed network. Originally described as a pyramid with 
the major Medellín and Cali capos at the top, it is increasingly viewed as a series of 
interconnected nodes. Literature from the 1980s and 1990s generally describes 
Colombian drug networks as ‘cartels’ – a reference to their hierarchical nature. In 1989, 
Lee explained that the top tier of Colombian cocaine elite was made up of about 100 
people from “coalitions of crime families” from Medellín and Cali—the apex of which 
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included five Medellín and two Cali drug lords.283 In 1994, former CIA analyst, Sidney 
Zabludoff, published a structural diagram in which he broke the Colombian cocaine 
trafficking industry down into five-tier pyramid. The bottom consisted of coca growers, 
agricultural workers and small base producers; next were semi-professional and unskilled 
part-time workers (guards, surveillance teams, radio and heavy equipment operators, and 
couriers); the middle level was made up of skilled freelancers (pilots, chemists, financial 
advisors, brokers, assassins, lawyers, accountants, and paramilitary operators); second to 
the top were specialized organizations (money laundering, transportation, enforcement, 
and laboratory operations); and at the apex of the pyramid were the “core” organizations 
and workers, including Pablo Escobar.284 In 1996, Patrick Clawson and Rensselaer Lee 
referred to Escobar as the Medellín “kingpin,” who not only exercised vast sway over 
trafficking operations, but whose “mantle of leadership, his access to the means of 
violence, and his ruthless domination of smaller exporters held the coalition together and 
established its identity.”285  
As mentioned above, serious discussion about what exactly constitutes a ‘cartel’ 
emerged over the last few years, and with it came a change in perception about the 
structure of the Medellín cartel. In 2007, Michael Kenny argued that the Colombian drug 
trade, during the time of Pablo Escobar, was comprised of a large web of hundreds of 
intergroup networks.286 The views of Zabludoff and Clawson and Lee during the 80s and 
90s are not necessarily mutually exclusive with the views of Kenny and others today. In 
reality, the Medellín cartel was both vertically and horizontally integrated. Clearly this 
network benefitted certain individuals more than others—an indication of vertical 
organization. Escobar’s involvement with the local population, his foray into politics, 
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personal connections, and public gestures and statements did, in fact, personify the 
Medellín cartel, and they empowered his influence over trafficking operations. He was, 
for all intents and purposes, a drug kingpin—benefitting more politically and financially 
than the everyday trafficker—although that is not to say the industry would not have 
functioned without him. Horizontal organization in the Medellín drug industry allowed 
decentralized decision-making authority and took advantage of individual specialties 
(such as the ones Zabludoff identified) in order to streamline large-scale processing and 
exporting to meet increasing international demand. It also enabled collaboration between 
trafficking and criminal groups. Thus, it is accurate to say that the Medellín cartel was 
vertically and horizontally organized, with both a core and a periphery. It had all the 
elements of a multinational corporation, but managed to avoid being held accountable as 
one.  
The “core” of the Medellin cartel, according to Phil Williams’ framework, 
consisted of six Medellín-based drug lords, called capos or narco-jefes: Pablo Escobar 
Gaviria, the Ochoa family (Jorge Luis Ochoa and his brothers Fabio and Juan David), 
José Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha, and Carlos Lehder Rivas. They were what Bruce Bagley 
refers to as the noveau riche, or “those people who have used drugs as an avenue of 
upward social mobility, and who, in seeking political protection, have sought to buy 
political power and social status.”287 Pablo Escobar started his career as a car thief, 
gradually working his way up through the ranks as a “mule,” or transporter, before 
becoming a Medellín kingpin.288 Jorge Ochoa was initially based out of Miami, where he 
sold cocaine in the Dadeland Twin Theatres parking lot in the late 1970s.289 The 
“periphery” consisted of a complicated system of contracts and subcontracts, each with 
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different functions and levels of responsibility.290 They occupied the industries in 
Zabludoff’s pyramid below the “core” organizations. Bagley describes this second group 
of narcotraficantes as “one that has kept a much lower profile and is far more intertwined 
with the existing political and social system within the country.”291  
4. Sources and Patterns of Funding 
The Medellin cartel was financed from a variety of sources and was innovative in 
its efforts to secure funding. Now standard in the drug industry, Pablo Escobar pioneered 
the insurance system, through which he and other drug kingpins made extraordinary 
profits. Assuming the chance of seizure was about 10 percent, Escobar demanded a 10 
percent premium on the U.S. wholesale price of cocaine from the supplier in order to 
insure against the possibility of a shipment being lost. If a shipment were lost, he would 
replace it—at the purchase price of cocaine in Colombia.292 Not only did he profit from 
charging insurance on the U.S. wholesale price—much higher than the purchase price in 
Colombia—but he profited enormously from the transaction as well. Starting around 
1990, Escobar began to levy “war taxes” on Medellín cocaine traffickers, which ranged 
from $100,000 to $200,000 per organization, per month.293 He also charged an export tax 
on cocaine traffickers, which bought them the right to traffic in what he considered—
perhaps rightfully—to be his industry. And, just like any other profitable business, the 
Medellín drug industry attracted wealthy outside investors. Businessmen with clean 
records could purchase a stake in cocaine shipments, called apuntada, which offered an 
exceptionally high return at a low risk, especially because they were insured.294 Members 
of the most prominent Medellín families participated in the apuntada system.295 
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Not surprisingly, the Medellín cartel made use of money laundering. Robert 
Mazur spent his career as a federal agent in the 1990s working to gather evidence against 
Colombian drug networks, including the Medellín cartel.296 After establishing a credible 
undercover identity as a money launderer, he gained first-hand access to the tools of the 
trade. He describes offshore accounts and corporations in Panama, Hong Kong, the 
British Islands and Gibraltar; safety deposit boxes in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, where large 
cash deposits were not recorded; repatriation of money to the United States in the form of 
an “offshore loan;” and secret meetings to avoid any paper trail of these activities.297 
Money laundering employed the use of not just the banking industry, but transportation 
and other industries as well. As Mazur writes, “The desire to have a share in this business 
has led the private client divisions of many international banks to develop sophisticated 
skills to avoid scrutiny from regulators.”298 And, overwhelmingly, they were successful 
in this endeavor. 
The Medellín cartel used violence as a tactic in order to ensure compliance with 
its financial demands. As Clawson and Lee write, “Threats of reprisals from Escobar’s 
hired assassins and enforcers ensured broad compliance with the trafficker’s financial 
demands as well as acceptance of his overall leadership of the cartel.”299 Furthermore, 
Escobar and the other capos yielded their drug money as a political tool, using bribes and 
financial contributions to essentially buy off individuals in government and law 
enforcement that may otherwise work against them. Importantly, during the days of the 
Medellín cartel, drug traffickers were not the only ones motivated by profit.  
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5. Network Overlap 
As demonstrated in the literature above, drug trafficking networks overlap with 
other criminal and trafficking networks, government, law enforcement, guerilla and 
terrorist organizations as a regular function of their business. These relationships cover a 
wide spectrum, “from spot sales at the lowest level to joint ventures and strategic 
alliances at the highest.”300 In large part, the Medellin cartel overlapped with other drug 
trafficking and illicit networks as an organizational reaction to the needs of Colombia’s 
high-volume cocaine smuggling, which demanded greater interaction and “export 
collaboration” among different trafficking groups.301 For instance, its ties to the Italian 
mafia were motivated by: (1) the rapid development of the European market; (2) an effort 
to create market entry strategies that minimized the risk of loss, seizures, and arrests; and 
(3) to assist with the logistical challenges of handling large volumes of cash from drug 
transactions, which could then be laundered through Europe or transported back to 
Colombia.302  
a. Overlap With Other Narcotics Networks 
Export collaboration yielded overlap between the Medellín cartel and 
other drug networks, for instance the rival Cali cartel, which allowed traffickers to 
maximize export volumes while reducing the risk to the individual supplier.303 Despite 
their differences, intra-city cooperation was “the norm” among Colombian drug 
organizations: they pooled information, developed joint marketing enterprises, sent 
composite shipments, and borrowed raw materials to meet delivery obligations, among 
other ventures.304 Still, the Medellín and Cali cartels were competitive—sometimes allied 
and sometimes at war.305 Medellín members attempted to intrude on Cali sales territory 
                                                 
300 Williams, “The Nature of Drug-Trafficking Networks,” 159. 
301 Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry, 38. 
302 Ibid., 63–64. 
303 Ibid., 38.  
304 Lee, The White Labyrinth, 110,112.  
305 Scott and Marshall, Cocaine Politics, 79. 
 90
in New York City—a major point of contention between the two groups.306 Additionally, 
some believe that individuals from Cali provided information that led to the arrest of 
Jorge Ochoa in 1987, and that they may have been behind the bombing of Escobar’s 
lavish “Monaco” residence in Medellín in 1988.307 There were major differences between 
the groups: Medellín leaders regularly used violence as a tactic to promote their political 
and social objectives, whereas the Cali leadership was much less confrontational. Still, 
assassination attempts abounded on both sides, and were responsible for the death of at 
least 150 people from various bombings, murders and shootouts in 1988 alone.308  
The DEA began to see associations between Cali and Medellín traffickers 
starting in the early1980s. A major example was the 114-pound cocaine shipment seized 
by U.S. Customs in Van Nuys, California in 1983, which was linked to Mexican drug 
lord Juan Ramón Matta Ballesteros, a close Cali associate, and Jorge Ochoa of 
Medellín.309 Matta began as the head of SETCO Air, which the FDN and State 
Department used from 1983 to 1985 to transport supplies and personnel for the Contras in 
Honduras—also a major transit point for narcotics en route to the United States. Matta 
teamed up with Mexican drug king Alberto Sicilia Falcón’s successor, Miguel Félix 
Gallardo, eventually becoming a cocaine kingpin himself. According to a 1983 Customs 
report, Matta was a “Class I DEA violator,” whose involvement in the drug industry 
earned him approximately $2 billion.310 Matta dealt directly with Cali drug leadership, 
from whom he bought cocaine to transport and distribute in the United States. He 
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in the media as a “former hired gun closely allied with [the] Medellín cartel.” Similarly, 
Matta’s personal money launderer, Isaac Kattan—a Cali resident—became known as 
“Isaac Kattan, Medellín.”311 
b. Overlap With Dissimilar Networks  
There is also clear evidence of overlap between the Medellín cartel and 
dissimilar networks, for instance the FARC and M-19. As with internetwork overlap, 
intra-network overlap occurs where it is mutually beneficial. Linkages between 
Colombian drug and revolutionary organizations did not necessarily create alliances and 
there are notable differences between them. Narcotics traffickers seek to buy into, 
manipulate, and coerce the political system but not to change it in a fundamental way as 
revolutionaries do. In general, Colombian leftist insurgency movements and radical 
terrorist groups seek the violent overthrow of an emplaced government structure to 
transform their respective societies, usually based on Marxist-Leninist ideology. They 
were (and are) politically motivated, whereas the Medellín cartel was profit-motivated.312 
While both groups made use of violence as a tactic to achieve their objectives, Medellín 
drug lords sought to preserve the political status quo and create a secure environment for 
their business operations, whereas revolutionaries wanted to upset it. Hostility existed 
over territorial control, relationships with the local coca-growing peasantry, and the 
economic benefits of the drug trade.313 Overlap occurred where it was mutually 
beneficial. In many cases, that link was purely financial. Where they have territorial 
control, for instance, insurgent groups would tax the cocaine industry at the cultivation 
and low-level processing phase.  
The relationship between the Medellín-based drug trade and the FARC, in 
the 1980s, was the first to really emphasize the international link between organized 
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crime and terrorism, which has been growing ever since.314 The FARC used its profits 
from the drug trade to finance terrorist operations, which are believed today to be 
somewhere between $60 and $100 million annually—about 50 percent of its overall 
income.315 Guerilla groups like the FARC extracted enormous protection rents from 
Medellín narcotraffickers, estimated anywhere between $200 and $600 million each 
year.316 The AUC—the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, a right-wing 
paramilitary group—is believed to receive around $75 million a year from the drug 
trade—approximately 70 to 80 percent of their annual income.317 The ELN (National 
Liberation Army, or Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional)—a “national liberation” movement 
inspired by the Cuban revolution that draws on Christian Liberation theory—gets about 
20 percent of its overall income from drug profits.318 These groups are able to use drug 
money to procure better weapons, refine their logistics, and generally improve their 
military campaigns. Where cocaine is grown indigenously, insurgent groups protected the 
production and distribution of coca and heroin, which allowed the poor rural population a 
stable and comfortable livelihood and guarantees them a cut of the profit. Still, most of 
the raw coca used in Colombia’s refining industry was not cultivated indigenously, but 
rather imported from Peru and Bolivia. Similarly, most of the Medellín processing 
facilities were located outside of guerilla control.319 Where they did not have direct 
territorial control, guerilla and paramilitary groups often functioned as security providers, 
ensuring law and order where the government failed.320 From the guerilla’s perspective, 
involvement in the drug trade benefits their political motivations. From the drug 
traffickers’ perspective, it benefits their financial motivations.  
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As mentioned above, there is evidence of tactical overlap between the 
Medellín cartel and the FARC, but the nature of that overlap has been hotly debated. In 
March of 1984, a joint DEA-Colombian raid on the Tranquilandia cocaine processing lab 
in the Yari plains of the Colombian jungle yielded documents that linked the lab to Pablo 
Escobar, Fabio Ochoa and his son, Jorge, Carlos Lehder, and Gonzalo Rodríguez 
Gacha—all members of the Medellín “core.”321 Max Mermelstein, a former top DEA 
informant, reported that the planning for this lab (which he attended) took place in Cali, 
and that Cali kingpin, Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela, was involved, although this was not 
evident in U.S. reporting.322 Colombian police reported that FARC snipers fired upon 
them during the raid, and that the camp was used by FARC guerillas, although others 
claimed that there were six such labs in the Yari region, all of which were reportedly 
known to the Colombian military.323 Reporting indicates that the FARC actually raided 
one of them in 1983, when they seized 18 people, four planes, and demanded a ransom of 
$425,000.324 
The overlap between the Medellín cartel and Colombian government is 
also important to note. Medellín leaders employed both the carrot and the stick in their 
interactions with the Colombian government, offering money to buy influence while at 
the same time using violence, or the threat of violence, as a means of intimidation to get 
what they wanted. In Colombia, cocaine traffickers were power brokers. Without 
regulations on political campaign contributions, drug money was used to prop up 
candidates that could be beneficial for drug trafficking operations. Much like lobbyists, 
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1990s, the cartel employed bombing campaigns, assassinations and kidnappings in order 
to protect their narrow economic interests and keep themselves and their families 
protected from the law.325  
As a multi-billionaire, Pablo Escobar had plenty of capital to throw at the 
problem. For instance, he donated money to both candidates in the 1982 Colombian 
presidential campaign. However, Escobar’s political aspirations extended beyond the 
protection of his economic interests, or the desire to keep himself and his associates out 
of jail. He wanted notoriety. Like some insurgent groups, Escobar funneled drug money 
into public works projects and social services in order to gain favor with the local 
population. He funded sewer repair, educational facilities, clinics, sports plazas, and 
reportedly built more public housing in Medellín than the Colombian government.326 The 
political impact of these gestures was tremendous. Escobar sought to influence 
Colombian politics, not just through monetary contributions, but by active political 
participation. He successfully ran for office in 1982, which earned him a position as an 
alternate deputy for Jairo Ortega’s seat in the Colombian House of Representatives.  
Carlos Lehder also had personal ambitions that extended beyond the 
Medellín trafficking enterprise. In 1981, U.S. Attorney General Robert Merkle called him 
a revolutionary whose motive was to use cocaine to destroy the United States (Merkle 
also indicted and convicted Lehder in Tampa in 1981).327 Avidly anti-American, Lehder 
founded a new political party to oppose the U.S.-Colombian extradition treaty in 1983 to 
“defend the fatherland against the imperialists and the Communists.”328 He is believed to 
have had Marxist leanings and to have supported the Colombian revolutionary group M-
19, although his apparent anti-communism calls this connection into question. The 
DEA’s assessment in the 1980s was that Lehder was more interested in his own agenda  
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than he was with supporting that of another group. As Rensselaer Lee argues, while 
Lehder’s revolutionary politics set him apart from his capo contemporaries, there is “no 
credible” evidence that Lehder supported M-19.”329 
c. Nature of Network Overlap 
In 1981, the Reagan Administration became eager to prosecute left-wing 
narcoterrorism, alleging links between the Medellín cartel, Colombian guerilla groups, 
the Cubans and Sandanistas that did not necessarily fit with the facts at hand. The 
objectivity of the DEA was ultimately compromised by this ideological agenda, 
particularly in 1983 when Vice President Bush merged DEA and CIA resources into the 
National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) to coordinate efforts for 
President Reagan’s declared “War on Drugs.”330 In general, the narco-guerilla stereotype 
perpetuated during the Reagan Administration, and afterward, is misleading. Rather, the 
relationship between drug traffickers and guerillas is, as Rensselaer Lee argues, “low-
level, opportunistic, and intermittent,” and does not constitute a pattern of strategic 
cooperation. Lee argues that this focus on a narco-terrorist linkage “obscures a more 
fundamental and insidious reality: the increasing penetration by South American cocaine 
traffickers into established economic and political institutions.”331 
In general, the linkages between the Medellín cartel and the Colombian 
government were financially motivated, and were alliances for mutual benefit. Pablo 
Escobar, Jorge Ochoa, and Carlos Lehder’s foray into Colombian politics made them 
outliers—exceptions to the rule. They all had personal ambitions that exceeded their 
financial motivations in different ways. Escobar appeared to desire an empire, and 
enjoyed being seen as a drug baron of sorts, which led him to get involved in Medellín 
social programs and establish himself as a local benefactor. Carlos Lehder had 
revolutionary leanings, which extended beyond his opposition to the U.S. extradition  
 
                                                 
329 Lee, The White Labyrinth, 158. 
330 Scott and Marshall, Cocaine Politics, 95.  
331 Lee, The White Labyrinth, 158. 
 96
treaty. Though there is confusion over whether he was an avid anti-Communist, or a 
revolutionary with Marxist leanings, Lehder clearly played the political sphere to his own 
advantage beyond what would benefit him financially.  
D. CONCLUSION  
Globalization and a mutual interest in overcoming increasing international 
pressure after 9/11 have enhanced the linkage between terrorism and organized crime—
particularly the drug industry. Terrorist groups engage in criminal activity to finance their 
terrorist operations, and often find a home in profitable enterprises like drug trafficking, 
kidnapping, cigarette smuggling, arms trafficking, robbery, extortion, etc. Furthermore, 
the drug trade is, and always has been, a demand-driven industry. Without addressing 
rising consumption in the United States and Western Europe in particular, it is difficult to 
imagine a scenario in which the drug trade goes out of business, in Colombia or 
elsewhere. During the 1980s, approximately 70 percent of federal funding went to law 
enforcement interdiction efforts, which attack the drug supply rather than the demand at 
home in the United States.332 More attention and resources must be devoted to addressing 
the demand before real changes can be made in the international drug trade.  
In order to more effectively counter entrenched drug traffickers and networks, the 
United States and international community must employ a flexible, adaptable approach 
that allows law enforcement to act, unimpeded by rigid bureaucracies and supported by 
reliable intelligence. This approach needs to be multipronged—not simply aimed at 
decapitating the individual or individuals who make the best headlines, or appear to be 
the “kingpin” of an organization—but one that treats the problem as the decentralized 
challenge that it is. One cannot develop a counternarcotics strategy without addressing 
the demand side of the issue because supply will always meet demand where there is 
lucrative profit opportunity. It must also address the problem of government corruption 
and involvement in the drug trade. Finally, it must be specific to the government 
involved. While the Medellín cartel provides important lessons, U.S. counternarcotics 
policy cannot apply the same mold it used in Colombia to Mexico or Afghanistan. Each 
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country is different, with a different set of circumstances, a unique set of challenges, and 
different potential solutions to at least mitigate the threat of violence and spillover effect 
at home.  
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In this thesis, I first explained the importance of illicit networks and the tools 
analysts currently employ to understand them. I then examined three main types of illicit 
networks individually: terrorist, proliferation and narcotics. Using Jemaah Islamiyah, 
A.Q. Khan, and the Medellín “cartel” as case studies, I asked the following questions: 
What are their motivations? How are they structured? What are their sources and patterns 
of funding? Do they overlap with other similar networks? Do they overlap with other 
types of illicit activity? If so, what is the nature of this overlap? I then offered 
conclusions and recommendations for how this information could be used to tailor U.S. 
government counter-network activity.  
B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
There is a view in the literature that it takes a network to counter a network. This 
phrase has been cited repeatedly to describe the challenge illicit networks pose to law 
enforcement and other hierarchical state-sponsored counter-network activity. Phil 
Williams, for example, argues that the transnational character of these new illicit 
networks makes them difficult to combat because law enforcement agencies are 
constrained by borders, but criminal networks are not.333 Others argue that hierarchies 
are well suited to combat illicit networks, citing the prominence of states in the 
international system as evidence of their staying power. After reviewing the literature and 
historical case studies particular to terrorist, proliferation and narcotics network, I 
contend that counter-network activity must employ a whole-of-government approach that 
incorporates SNA, the analysis of network leadership and personalities, and requires 
inter-agency and multi-national cooperation and support. While non-state networks are 
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inherently more flexible and adaptable than government and international bureaucracies, 
it is the responsibility of international states and transnational institutions to make illicit 
activity as difficult and costly as possible for those that may be motivated to engage in it.  
1. Terrorist Network Typology 
Terrorist networks, in general, are ideologically motivated. The actors that 
comprise a terrorist network have close trust ties, engendered either by family, education, 
or similar combat experiences (e.g., the Afghan war). They frequently interact with other 
types of illicit networks, for instance those that engage in narcotics and other types of 
trafficking. Terrorist networks also overlap with other types of terrorist networks that 
may share similar ideological leanings. However, the nature of these interactions is most 
often mutually beneficial. Jemaah Islamiyah overlaps significantly with Al Qaeda, 
although this linkage is not ideological, as some may suspect. Rather, it is a financial link 
that serves a purpose both for JI and for Al Qaeda. From JI’s perspective, Al Qaeda 
provides support that allows JI to pursue its ideological mission, and from Al Qaeda’s 
perspective, JI’s terrorist activity fits into Al Qaeda’s broader global jihad. Terrorist 
networks overlap with trafficking networks, but this linkage is mainly financial, as well. 
Drugs, diamonds, and other natural resources are a solid source of revenue with which to 
support terrorist activities. And, while Osama bin Laden, in particular, has expressed 
interest in pursuing WMD, clear linkages between terrorist and proliferation networks are 
not yet evident.  
2. Proliferation Network Typology 
Proliferation networks are motivated by profit. The actors that engage in 
proliferation networks are, for the most part, businessmen. Their relationships are 
transactional, which does not necessitate close trust ties, but successful proliferation 
businesses, as was the case with A.Q. Khan, are based on close trust ties fostered over 
years of professional and personal interaction. Actors engage in risky behavior because 
the consequences have proven to be minimal—if any—and are reasonably calculated to 
be worth the risk given the benefits involved. Trade in dual-use commodities is highly 
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profitable. Given the multiple applications of dual-use items, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to tell whether any given item is headed toward civilian or military purposes. 
States, individuals, and businesses are therefore able to navigate through the international 
“gray” market that exists between licit and illicit enterprise, and often blurs the lines 
between. Interaction between proliferation networks and other types of illicit activity is 
generally done only if it is profitable—for example, the relationship between the A.Q. 
Khan network and Iran, North Korea and Libya’s proliferation personnel. Those engaged 
in proliferation networks can either be witting or unwitting; some are willing to engage in 
risky behavior for the profit opportunities, some are taken advantage of without their 
knowledge. Actors are generally unarmed, and unwilling to physically defend their 
product or interests. They can likely be frightened out of illicit activity either financially 
or through the threat of disruption to their lives in one way or another. As the case of Urs, 
Marco and Franco Tinner demonstrates, actors in a proliferation network can be coerced 
to turn on their colleagues—for a profit.  
3. Narcotics Network Typology 
Narcotics networks are most often motivated by profit. Actors that engage in 
narcotics networks are linked by close trust ties, either family, ethnic, or by shared 
experiences. They interact with other types of illicit activity as it benefits their trafficking 
enterprise; generally, the linkages are purely financial, although we do see examples 
(e.g., the FARC) in which a particular network can be dual-purposed. Drug networks 
develop an indigenous capacity to carry out operations that may otherwise engender 
suspicion, for instance, by hiring private pilots to transport their commodity. Narcotics 
networks are territorial and frequently engage in violence to defend their turf and to 
terrorize those who might challenge them into submission. Of particular importance, 
recently, have been the multiple targeted killings in Mexico against journalists who might 
otherwise publish negative information about the so-called ‘cartels.’ Mexican drug 
networks engage in gruesome violent tactics, like beheadings, which by definition could 
be classified as terrorism because they are meant to cause fear in and send a message to a 
wider target audience. Still, their orientation is primarily profit-driven. The defense of 
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their “turf,” however gruesome, is often to protect their financial land route—especially 
along the U.S.-Mexico border, which is a highly profitable way to traffic drugs into the 
United States. Furthermore, their targeted violence against journalists serves to preserve 
the status quo and protect their financial interests.  
4. Network Similarities 
While the three types of transnational networks are different, they do bear distinct 
similarities. Each network is opportunistic. They exploit holes in the existing national and 
international framework undeterred by borders, boundaries or laws. They have the benefit 
of competitive adaptation, which means they can adjust to changing circumstances in a 
way that rigid hierarchies cannot. These networks are increasingly decentralized. 
Although often characterized by a leadership persona, more and more they rely on lower-
level individuals to carry out basic tasks, independent of any theoretical central 
“leadership.” Where there is a leader, he or she is typically charismatic, displays 
excessive hubris, takes audacious challenges, and often gets people on his side by doing 
public works projects. These networks are frequently marked by close trust ties, even 
when network actors are driven purely by profit. Even A.Q. Khan’s proliferation network 
would not have functioned without his close inner circle.  
Importantly, the apparent outliers in each of these different types of networks 
have very similar characteristics. Hambali and Noordin Mohammed Top in Jemaah 
Islamiyah, A.Q. Khan in his network, and Pablo Escobar and Carlos Lehder of the 
Medellín cartel all had personal ambitions that exceeded what was required to stay in 
business. Their personal actions went above and beyond what was necessary to serve the 
motivation of their network—in the case of A.Q. Khan, by conversing with the media and 
establishing social programs to “give back” to the community. Pablo Escobar ran for 
office in the Colombian government and, like Khan, practiced social benevolence, setting 
up more public works projects in his hometown of Medellín than the Colombian 
government could provide, which engendered trust and admiration among locals. Carlos 
Lehder also had strong political leanings, and arguably used his position within the 
Medellín cartel to further his personal ideological motivations. Each of these men had 
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larger-than-life personalities, liked to be recognized for their achievements, and funneled 
their money into visible projects that engendered admiration for them and their activities. 
People knew who they were, unlike other network actors who were able to fly more 
seamlessly under the radar. These types of personalities cannot be coded for—they are 
not easily broken down into mathematical quantifications, as SNA would attempt to do. 
They require steady observation and analysis and are excellent examples of what SNA 
tools are yet not equipped to address. The study of these individuals requires the careful 
eye and intuition of an intelligence analyst who can more accurately assess their 
“importance” in a network than any mathematical algorithm. While taking out one of 
these leaders may not decapitate a network, it certainly may do a lot to prevent the spread 
of ideas, or a positive social association of what an illicit network is capable of. It may 
also set an example for the consequence of engaging in this type of activity, as was the 
case with Pablo Escobar’s killing.  
Most importantly, the conditions that foster one type of illicit transnational 
network will also more than likely facilitate another. Trafficking routes are often not just 
good for narcotics, but for humans, small arms, and an unlimited variety of other 
contraband and counterfeit items. Globalization’s unintended consequence has been to 
provide an open platform from which these networks can conduct their day-to-day 
activities. With the vast volume of international commerce, it is often difficult to detect 
the needle in a haystack. Traffickers are experts at hiding their goods, and often accept 
the discovery of a small amount of their goods as a cost of doing business. The profits are 
too high to be deterred by the threat of being caught, and there will always be individuals 
out there willing to take the risk.  
5. Network Differences 
Clearly, there are different motivations behind each of the three types of networks 
discussed in this thesis. These differences are what make them unique. While 
proliferation and narcotics networks are both motivated by profit, their products different 
significantly. A dual-use commodity is inherently distinct from a natural resource 
because of its multiple applications and its ability to exist in the international gray 
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market. Natural resources, like drugs, diamonds, timber, etc., bear certain similarities 
because the networks that traffic them are much more territorial and willing to resort to 
violence than the networks that traffic dual-use commodities. One might even 
characterize nuclear proliferation and the trafficking of dual-use items as a white-collar 
trafficking enterprise because those that are involved, even the so-called “foot soldiers,” 
are generally wealthy, and profit enormously from their transactions. Conversely, the 
“foot soldiers” involved in the trafficking of drugs, diamonds, and other natural resources 
do not tend to profit much, if at all, from the transaction. Low-level poppy farmers in 
Afghanistan, for instance, see none of the revenues from the drug trade that the Taliban 
or higher-level government officials enjoy. Similarly, coca farmers in Peru and Bolivia 
did not benefit from drug revenues the way Pablo Escobar and his contemporaries did. 
Terrorism does not involve a commodity, and its ideological motivation, therefore, 
differentiates it from trafficking networks. Terrorist networks interact and overlap with 
trafficking enterprises, but only to the extent that it benefits their ideological objectives.  
6. Network Overlap 
Despite widespread concern over the potential for nuclear terrorism, there is not 
much evidence of the overlap between terrorist and proliferation networks. There is 
distinct overlap between terrorism and narcotics trafficking, which we see in the news 
regularly with respect to the Taliban in Afghanistan, but it is important to understand the 
nature of this relationship and the motivations behind it. According to Curtis and 
Karacan, who wrote a report on network overlap in Western Europe for the Library of 
Congress, network overlap can come in three forms: (1) alliances for mutual benefit; (2) 
direct involvement of terrorists in organized crime, and (3) replacement of ideology by 
profit.334 In general, the case studies I examined in this thesis display alliances for mutual 
benefit, with specific outliers that have personal motivations.  
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C. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In addition to creating a more cohesive, whole-of-government approach to 
catching these criminals from multiple angles, there is one important lesson to draw from 
this analysis of all three networks: follow the money. Money is the key that makes each 
network tick, whether it is financially motivated or not. In each case, these networks 
could not operate without a steady cash flow. They utilize remarkably similar techniques 
to conceal and move their capital. If the U.S. government were able to synchronize 
efforts on just one platform, I recommend it be in tracking and prosecuting illicit finance. 
Bankers are largely able to avoid prosecution because law enforcement fails to expose 
evidence of their involvement in dirty money.335 As former federal agent, Robert Mazur, 
writes in his recent New York Times op-ed, the U.S. government needs an elite multi-
agency task force to identify institutions and businesses that facilitate illicit finance 
around the globe.336 Because banks and front companies often engage in multiple illicit 
activities, a detailed database for all types of unlawful financial transactions could help 
identify important linkages that might otherwise be overlooked by network-specific 
bureaucracies. Stemming the flow of dirty would restrict the stream of illegal 
commodities and severely hinder the operations of organizations and individuals that 
threaten national and international security. 
It is clear that a strategy based exclusively on decapitation is not effective in any 
of the three networks—terrorist, proliferation or narcotics. While targeting a drug kingpin 
or terrorist figurehead may appear to be the clear course, this “leadership interdiction” is 
not sustainable in a complex adaptive system that is able to adjust to changing 
circumstances.337 Targeted kill/capture missions are an important part of an overall 
strategy, but SNA is not an adequate tool in and of itself to prosecute them. SNA is an 
extremely useful instrument—a way to visualize the actors in any given network—but 
cannot adequately explain the motivations of individual actors or how their personalities 
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affect the overall organization. Algorithms that attempt to identify the most “important” 
network members based on different quantifications do not sufficiently describe the 
extent to which these individuals affect network operations. I recommend that analysts 
pay serious attention to network leadership and personalities, even if their involvement in 
the appears purely charismatic. Their ability to inspire, influence, manipulate and enable 
others for their personal gains can be significant, and, in some cases, targeted “leadership 
interdiction” may be the most effective way to stop them. 
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